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Karesh: Devolution of Interests in Trust Estates

THE SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW QUARTERLY
REVIEW SECTION
DEVOLUTION OF INTERESTS IN TRUST
ESTATES
COLEMAN KAIESH*

This article will be devoted to a discussion of the law in
South Carolina covering the devolution on death of interests
in trust estates--the interest of the beneficiary on the one
hand, the title of the trustee on the other: in other words,
what happens to the beneficiary's interest on his death, and
what happens to the trustee's title on his. The law on the subject is fairly plain and elementary, and this dissertation may
therefore be an essay on the obvious, but, perhaps, justified
as an attempt to assemble and put all the parts into a single,
if oversized, package.
The instrument which creates the trust may itself provide,
within applicable legal limits, what shall happen to the beneficiary's interest when he dies. The beneficiary may have only
a life estate, which will die with him. The interest may be defeated by his death before attaining a certain age, or before
the happening, or absent the happening, of a certain contingency or event; and the instrument may direct where the interest shall then go.1 With these instrument-directed dispositions we are not concerned.
If the interest of the beneficiary is turned into a legal one
by reason of the operation of the Statute of Uses2 , the problem of the fate of his interest ceases to be one of Trusts and
finds no place in this discussion.
*A.B. 1923, LL.B. 1925, University of South Carolina. Professor of Law, University
of South Carolina. Member South Carolina Bar.

1. See Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 142, comm. b.
2. Sec. 9038, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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Nor are we here concerned fundamentally with cases
-where the beneficiary's interest never materializes, as where
-the interest has lapsed by reason of the beneficiary's death
before, the death of the settlor-testator. If there is no gift
over, or accretion to the other members of a class to which
he belonged, the gift will fail unless taken care of by a lapse
statute.3
In the case of the trustee, the trust instrument may like-wise provide what shall happen to the trustee's title upon his
.death.4 Similarly, there is no involvement here with this as:pect of the matter.
I
THE BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST

The problem of what happens to the beneficiary's interest
upon his death is comparatively simple. Equitable interests
adapt and mold themselves to legal interests, under the prin-

3. Such as See. 8926, S. C. Code of Laws 1942, which provides: "If
any child should die in the lifetime of the father or mother, leaving
issue, any legacy of personalty or devise of real estate given in the
last will of such father or mother shall go to such issue * * ." Presumably this applies "to estates given in trust for children. Restatement
of Trusts, Sec. 112, comm. f; 118 A. L. R. 559. In Citizens & Southern
Bank v. Cleveland, 200 S. C. 3'73, 20 S. E. (2d) 811 (1942), there
was a gift in trust of a yearly sum to testator's son during the widow's
lifetime; the son predeceased the testator. The court, without reference
to Sec. 8926, held that the gift did not pass to the son's child, on the
ground that the gift was personal to the son and died with him.
What is -virtually a lapse statute, at least in part, is Sec. 8874,
S. C. Code of Laws 1942, which forbids one who is convicted of unlawfully killing another from participating in the slain person's estate,
and provides: "Provided, further, that in case the offender is the
parent of a child or children, who if such parent were dead, would
inherit from the deceased, then, in that event, the said child or children
shall immediately take the interest in the estate of the deceased, which
the offending parent would have taken except for the provisions hereof."
In Rasor v. Rasor, 173 S. C. 365, 175 S. E. 545 (1934), a father loft
property in trust for his children. He was killed by one of them, who
was thereafter convicted of murder. The slayer was denied the right
to take, but his children were let in by virtue of the proviso.
4. See Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 108, comm. f and g. Roberts v.
Lesley, 8 Richardson's Equity 35 (1855); Cone v. Cone, 61 S. C. 512,
39 S. E. 478 (1901); 65 C. J. 575.
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ciple that equity follows the law. An English case, Hopkins
v. Hopkins,5 puts the matter aptly:
"It is the maxim of this Court that trust estates,
which are the creatures of equity, shall be governed by
the same rules as legal estates, in order to preserve the
uniform rule of property; and that the owner of the trust
shall have the same power over the trust as he would
have if he had the legal estate for the like extent or
interest."
The principle is similarly expressed in the celebrated
6
South Carolina case of Heath v. Bishop:
"As a general rule * * it may be stated that the attributes with which the laws of this country have invested the institution of property attach alike to equitable as to legal estates. Under the maxim, that equity
follows the law, the system of trusts has been molded into,
an almost perfect analogy and correspondence with legal
estates. Equitable interests admit of the same modifications as to the quantity of right, duration, time, conditions and mode of enjoyment that appertain to estates
at law."
Death of the Beneficiary Intestate
Upon the death of the beneficiary intestate, his interest
will naturally devolve upon his heirs at law or his administrator, depending upon the nature of the property involved:
i.e., real or personal. Here again is pertinent dictum from
Heath v. Bishop:7
5. West t. Hardw. 606, 618 (1739). To the same effect is another
English case, Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Win. 700, 713 (1732). These two
cases are referred to in the footnotes at page 313 of Scott's Cases on
Trusts (3d Ed.).
6. 4 Richardson's Equity 46, 55 Am. Dec. 654 (1851). This case is best
known for its treatment of restraints on alienation. See, also, Richardson v. Manning, 12 Richardson's Equity 454, 483 (1866), where the
interest involved was said to be "subject, being a trust, to the same
rules of descent and conveyance which would apply to it if it was
a legal estate." The interest was actually held to pass under a devise.
See note 27 infra.
7. Note 6 supra.
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"The same canons of descent apply to both systems.
They are in the main subject to the same rules of succession. They may alike be held in severalty, in joint-tenancy,
coparcenery and in common. They are devisable and assignable * * and they are both subject to the payment of
debts."
The Restatement of Trusts s generalizes as follows:
"Upon the death intestate of the beneficiary of a
trust, the devolution of his interest is governed by the
same rules of descent and distribution as govern the descent and distribution of a corresponding legal interest."
That the interest of an intestate beneficiary descends to
his heirs is implicit in two South Carolina statutes, original
English statutes made of force in 1712.9 The first of these
(Sec. 9044) is captioned Trusts Shall be Assets in Hands of
Heirs, and provides in part:
"If any cestui que trust shall die, leaving a trust in
fee simple to descend to his heir, such trust shall be
deemed and taken, and is hereby declared to be assets by
descent * *."

The section then goes on to provide that such assets shall be
subject to obligations of the ancestor beneficiary, and the
succeeding section (Sec. 9045) provides that such obligations
shall not be payable out of the heir's own estate.
There appear to be no cases in this state in which the
question of the devolution of an intestate trust beneficiary's
interest has been put directly in controversy, and it is to be
assumed that the proposition that it descends or is distributed
as does a legal interest is taken for granted.10

8. Sec. 142. See Scott on Trusts, Sec. 142; Bogert on Trusts and
Trustees, Sec. 189.
9. Secs. 9044, 9045, S. C. Code of Laws 1942; 2 Stat. 527.
10. Cave v. Anderson, 50 S. C. 293, 27 S. E. 693 (1897), holding
that a Circuit Judge's charge stating the proposition as to descendibility was not misleading. Cobb v. Brown, Speers Equity 564 (1844),
and Richardson v. Cooley, 20 S. C. 347 (1883), holding in each case that
the share of a deceased beneficiary under a trust passed to his distributee, but that the action to recover should be maintained by tho
administrator. Barrett v. Cochran, 8 S. C. 48 (1875), holding that
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The interest of a vendee under a contract of sale of real
estate is an equitable interest, and in fact many of the cases
say that the relationship between the vendor and the vendee
is that of trustee and beneficiary," although, objectively
viewed, it cannot be said that a strict trust exists.= That the
equitable interest of the vendee descends as does a legal interest is seen from these typical statements in two cases:
"The vendee is treated as the owner of the land and
it is devisable and descendible as his real estate."'m
"He (the vendee) may mortgage it, convey it to an-

heir of deceased beneficiary succeeded to the latter's rights and, under facts, should be allowed to intervene in suit by trustee against
third person.
The incident of descendibility is always collaterally and consequentially involved in those cases in which the issue is whether a deceased
beneficiary had an estate for life or in fee. A finding that it was the
latter would perforce result in a holding for the heirs of the intestate
beneficiary, and such was the conclusion in Bratton v. Massey, 15 S. C.
227 (1880), and Haynsworth v.. Goodwin, 35 S. C. 54, 14 S. E. 491
(1891).
An equitable estate in fee simple conditional can be created, and,
according to the decision in Withers v. Jenkins, 14 S. C. 597, 608 (1880),
"when thus existing in equity, is subject to all the rules of descent and
otherwise, and is accompanied with most of the incidents and attributes
applicable to such estates at law." The estate thus created is not devisable, and upon the death of the tenant in fee conditional it does
not descend to heirs generally but per formam doni. In the case just
cited and in Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545- (1882), equitable estates
in fee simple conditional were created. In the former the estates reverted to the grantor because the tenant died without leaving issue
surviving; in the second the court struck down a devise by the tenant
and awarded the property to her issue under the terms of the deed,
saying, however, that it was doubtful whether there was a genuine
*trust and that, in any event, the duties of the trustees having ceased
the property went directly to the issue.
11. See, for example, Landrum v. Hatcher, 11 Richardson's Law 54,
70 Am.Dec. 237 (1857); Gregorie v. Bulow, Richardson's Equity Cases
285 (1832); Roddey v. Elam, 12 Richardson's Equity Cases 343 (1866);
Peay v. Seigler, 48 S.C. 496, 26 S. E.885, 59 Am. St. Rep. 731 (1896);
Whitmire v. Boyd, 53 S.C. 315, 31 S.E. 306 (1898); Ridgeway v. Broadway, 91 S.C. 544, 75 S. E. 132 (1912).
12. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 18; Whitmire v. Boyd, note 11 supra,
where the relationship is spoken of as practically that of mortgagor
and mortgagee.
13. Landrum v. Hatcher, note 11 supra.
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other, or devise it, and if he dies intestate, it descends to
his heirs." 14
In the first of the two cases from which quotation has
just been made, a testator, after making his will, entered into
a contract to buy land but died before legal title could be
put into him. As the law then stood, after-acquired real property could not pass by will, and the court held that the equitable interest of the vendee passed as intestate property to his
heirs, who could compel the executor to fulfil the contract by
paying the purchase price.1
14. Ridgeway v. Broadway, note 11 supra. For a similar statement,

see Roddey v. Elam, note 11 supra. As to inheritability and descendibility of equitable estates generally, see 26 C. J. S. 1008.
Another type of descendible equitable interest is that existent where
a borrower gives a deed absolute on its face intended as security. Equity,
of course, treats this as a mortgage under the maxim "once a mortgage,
always a mortgage." Despite the Act of 1791 (See. 8701, S. C. Code of
Laws 1942), stripping real estate mortgages of their title-carrying attributes and providing that until foreclosure the mortgagor shall remain
the owner of the land and the mortgagee shall have only a lien, it seems
hardly open to doubt that when a borrower gives a deed absolute as
security, the legal title passes to the grantee-mortgagee, and the grantormortgagor retains only the beneficial, or equitable, ownership. This is
demonstrated by the fact that a bona fide purchaser for value of the
property, without actual or constructive notice of the security nature
of the transaction, acquires from the grantee a good title, cutting off
the equity of redemption of the grantor-mortgagor. Jones v. Hudson,
23 S. C. 494 (1885). The grantee of a deed absolute intended as security,
while he cannot be regarded as a strict trustee, certainly occupies a
fiduciary or trust relationship. Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 49 S. E.
232 (1904). Treating the ownership of the grantor-mortgagor as an
equity, it follows that upon his death intestate the interest will pass
to his heirs, and they may maintain an action to have the deed declared
a mortgage and allowed to redeem. While there are no cases litigating
the propriety of the heirs' maintenance of such an action, cases are to
be found in which the heirs have brought such actions: Buchanan v.
Buchanan, 38 S. C. 410, 17 S. E. 218 (1892); Bristow v. Rosenberg,
45 S. C. 614, 23 S. E. 957 (1895); Francis v. Francis, 78 S. C. 178,
58 S. E. 804 (1907); Frady v. Ivester, 118 S. C. 195, 110 S. E. 135
(1921).
15. There are at least three other cases in which a testator, after the
execution of his will, entered into a contract to purchase real property
and died before acquiring legal title. In each the court held that the
equitable interest passed to the heirs, who could compel the executor
to exonerate the property by payment of the purchase price. Brown
v. James, 3 Strobhart's Equity 24 (1849); Watson v. Child, 9 Richardson's Equity 129 (1856); Roberts v. Smith, 21 S. C. 455 (1884).
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What has been said up to this point has been with reference to express trusts, but the same logic applies to the
interests of beneficiaries under resulting trusts, and the Restatement and other authorities 16 state this view. Consequently, the interest of the intestate beneficiary of a resulting
trust passes to his heirs at law or personal representative.
No South Carolina cases put the matter directly in issue, but
of the many cases dealing with the typical resulting trust
arising out of payment of the purchase money, some of them
have presented assertions by heirs that their ancestor was
entitled to a resulting trust by reason of the payment of the
purchase money.17 No objection was raised, or could be raised,
that the trust interest so implied by law could not pass by succession to the heirs.
In the other most frequent type of resulting trust-where
an express trust fails in whole or in part-the interest of the
beneficiary of such a trust would be subject to the same rules
of succession. Where the trust is created inter vivos and fails
initially or subsequently, the settlor will take on a resulting
trust, and if he thereafter dies intestate the interest will pass
to his heirs or personal representative. If an express trust
created by will is initially ineffectual, there will be a resulting
trust (unless there is a gift over) in favor of the heirs or
residuary takers as the case may be,18 but here the heirs or
residuary takers would be the original beneficiaries of the
resulting trust and not successors to an equitable interest belonging to the decedent.
Another type of resulting trust in which the question may
arise whether the beneficiary's interest will pass on intestacy
16. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 407 (2), comm. e; Scott on Trusts,
Sec. 407; 26 C. J.S. 1008.
17. Minton v. Pickens, 24 S. C. 592 (1885); Odom v. Beverly 32
S. C. 107, 10 S. E. 835 (1889); Buchanan v. Buchanan, note 14 supra;
Rogers v. Rogers, 52 S. C. 388, 29 S. E. 812 (1897); DeHihns v. Free,

70 S. C. 344, 49 S. E. 841 (1904); Miller v. Saxton, 75 S. C. 237, 55
S..E. 310 (1906); Bell v. Edwards, 78 S. C. 410, 59 S. E. 535 (1907).
18. Elliott v. Morris, Harper's Equity 281 (1824), trust not declared
on face of will; Johnson v. Clarkson, 3 Richardson's Equity 305 (1851),

trust imperfectly declared in will; Ford, Daingerfield, 8 Richardson's
Equity 95 (1856), trust in favor of slaves void and in absence of heirs

trust resulted to state by escheat; Brennan v. Winkler, 37 S. C. 457,
16 S. E. 190 (1892), attempted charitable trust invalid; City of Columbia
v. Monteith, 139 S. C. 262, 137 S. E. 727 (1926), attempted charitable

trust invalid.
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to his heirs at law or personal representative is that which
is impressed "where a person standing in a fiduciary relation
uses fiduciary funds to purchase property and takes title
in his own name." This classification, to be found in the South
Carolina cases, 9 is taken from the grouping of resulting
trusts set down by Perry, in his work on Trusts,2 0 an old
favorite of the South Carolina courts. The issue of the proper
assertion by the heirs or administrator of such a beneficiary
has not been brought to the fore in any South Carolina case,
but it is implicitly recognized in at least one.2
On principle it would seem that where land or other property may be subjected to a constructive trust, the right to
assert it would pass, on death of the person entitled, to his
heirs or personal representative,=
19. Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Risley, 25 S. C. 809 (1886); Rogers v.
Rogers, note 17 supra; Green v. Green, 56 S. C. 193, 34 S. E. 249, 46
L. R. A. 525 (1899) ; Phillips v. Yon, 61 S. C. 426, 39 S. E. 618 (1901) ;
Walker v. Taylor, 104 S. C. 1, 88 S. E. 300 (1915); Sparks v. McCraw,
112 S. C. 519, 100 S. E. 161 (1914); Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 184
S. E. 859 (1926); Ex ParteJohnson, 147 S. C. 259, 145 S. E. 113 (1928).
20. Sec. 138 (3d Ed.); See. 125 (7th Ed.). While this label is given
to this factual situation, it is difficult to justify it as anything other
than a constructive trust, since, even though he may be acting in good
faith, a trustee violates his duty in investing trust funds in property
and taking title in his own name. The Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 404,
listing the various types of resulting trusts, does not so catalogue this
situation. See the dissenting, and critical, opinion in Green v. Green,
note 19 supra. See, also, Dominick v. Rhodes, 202 S. C. 19, 24 S. E. (2d)
168 (1943), where a father acting in good faith mingled his incompetent
son's funds with his own, and the court termed it a constructive trust.
In most cases it -is immaterial whether the trust is called resulting or
constructive, since the nature of the relief afforded to the beneficiary
is substantially the same in either instance. Since the constructive trust
is designed to prevent or undo fraud, which is it's essence, it may be
that the court, in characterizing a bona fide acquisition of property by
a fiduciary in his own name with trust funds a resulting trust, is taking
out the stigma that would be present if it were termed a constructive
trust. Obviously, if the trustee acts in bad faith, it can be nothing but
a constructive trust.
21. Green v. Green, note 19 supra.
22. Scott on Trusts, Sec. 462.5; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, See.
472. See the dissenting opinion in Green v. Green, note 19 supra, in
which the dissenting Justice treats the factual situation there as giving
rise to a constructive trust, rather than resulting, and raises no point
that the heirs of the alleged beneficiaries could not maintain the action.
A nice point may arise in these cases: if a trustee in bad faith
breaches his trust by buying property in his own name with trust money,
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Death of the Beneficiary Testate
Applying again the truism that equity follows the law, the
consequence is that the beneficiary's interest, unless otherwise controlled by the terms of the trust instrument, may
'be transferred by will.23 This, again, is merely saying that
equitable interests generally are thus transferable, and the
-quoted passages from Heath v. Bishop, Landrum v. Hatcher,
and Ridgeway v. Broadway,2 bear this out.
the beneficiary has a choice of remedies-sue for the money and ask
-foran equitable lien on the property so acquired, or .sue for the property as a substitute for the money on the theory of a constructive trust.
Gulphill v. Isbell, 1 Bailey's Law 230, 19 Am. Dec. 675 (1829); Sollee
-v. Croft, 7 Richardson's Equity 34 (1854); Matthews v. Heyward, 2
S. C. 239 (1870); Richardson v. Day, 20 S. C. 412 (1883); Walker v.
Taylor, note 19 supra; Restatement of Restitution, Sees. 160, 161; Scott
on Trusts, Sec. 463. If the beneficiary had obtained a decree declaring
that he was the equitable owner of the real property so improperly
acquired by his fiduciary, and the beneficiary thereafter died, his heirs
or devisees would undoubtedly succeed to the interest. If he had not
made such an election-to seek a constructive trust-and had died, would
the right to have the trust impressed pass to his personal representative, who succeeded to the right to recover the misused money, or to
the successors in interest of the real property? Logic points to the former. Scott on Trusts, Sees. 462.4, 462.5; but see Bogert on Trusts and
Trustees, Sec. 472.
That the heirs or personal representative of an intestate who is the
beneficial owner of property through a constructive trust should succeed
to his interest is shown by analogy to the cases in which such successors have been allowed to maintain actions to set aside transfers obtained from their decedent by fraud or duress--rescission, like the constructive trust, being merely one of the methods to prevent unjust enrichment. See, at each end of the time range, Rowland v. Sullivan, 4
DeSaussure's Equity 518 (1814); Page v. Lewis, 209 S. C. 212, 39 S. E.
(2d) 787 (1946).
There is a difference of opinion over whether, until there is an adjudication that a person is entitled to a constructive trust in property,
he actually has an equitable interest. Scott (Trusts, Sec. 462.5) takes
the view that there is an equitable interest from the outset-from the
time of the transaction giving rise to it. Bogert (Trusts and Trustees,
Secs. 472, 186) seems to believe that until there has been an adjudication the right is a mere chose in action, but that when there is such a
decree it will establish the trust as of the time of the wrong.
23. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 132, comm. b; Scott on Trusts, Sees.
132, 132.1; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 188; 68 C. J. 495. Historically, the devise of the use is one of the earliest trust functions,
antedating the Statute of Uses (1535) and the Statute of Wills (1540).
24. 65 C. J. 539; 68 C. J. 496.
25. Notes 6, 7; 11, 13; 11, 14; supra.
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In Landrum v. Hatcher, it will be recalled, the court decided that where a vendee, who became such after the making
of his will, died before acquiring legal title, his equitable interest passed to his heirs as intestate property because of
the then existing law that after-acquired real property could
not pass by will. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed
out:
"The equitable interest therefore in question if it had
been acquired before the will was made would have
passed by the devise, but being acquired after and there
being no republication passed to the heir."
If the testator had died after 1858, the equitable interest
would have passed to the devisee and not to the heirs, since,
in that year, legislation was enacted designed to permit after26
acquired real property to pass under will.

That the beneficiary's interest is the subject of testamentary transfer is evident in the statute2 dealing with the
mode of transfer of the interest:
"All grants and assignments of any trust or confidence shall be in writing, signed by the party granting or
assigning the same, or by suck last will or devise, or
shall be utterly void and of none effect."
The dicta and near-dicta of the cases mentioned, and the
indirect statutory recognition, are fortunately not the sole
sources of the principle that beneficial interests can be transmitted by will. In Schmidt v. Schmidt,2 the owner of land
made a deed in trust for his children, but under such circumstances that in an action later brought by the father against
his children, a decree was obtained that the transfer was
merely in the nature of a mortgage or security. In this sequel
case the court concluded that, since this was the nature of
the transaction, or that at least that it was a trust for pay26. See. 8910, S. C..Code of Laws 1942. In Brown v. James, note 15
supra, decided before the passage of the Act, the court remarked, as in

Landrum v. Hatcher, note 11 supra, that a vendee who acquired his in-

terest, but not the title, before making his will could devise the interest.
27. Sec. 9043, S. C. Code of Laws 1942. In Richardson v. Manning,
note 6 supra, a gift in trust of income of real and personal property
pur autre vie was held to pass to the executor of the will of the beneficiary, who died during the lifetime of the cestui quo vie.
28. 7 Richardson's Equity 201 (1855).
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ment of debts, the grantor was in equity the owner of the
property, and that the equitable interest so retained by, or
created for, him passed under his will. It was held:
"Equitable estates in land owned by a testator at
the execution of the will, pass under its devises, though
the testator afterwards acquire the legal title." (Chancellor's decree).
"After a conveyance for a mere particular purpose,
as for the payment of debts, or the creation of a charge,
the grantor, in contemplation of equity, remains seized
of his original estate, and his equitable interest will pass
by will."
The case of Lindler v. Nicholson Bank & Trust Co.2 holds,
inferentially, that the interest of a trust beneficiary under
an express trust, and, directly, that the interest of a beneficiary under a resulting trust, can pass under the beneficiary's will. In that case the settlor conveyed to the named defendant property in trust to manage and rent for a period
of five years and to pay the income to the settlor. The trust
instrument further provided that if at the expiration of the
period, the settlor could satisfy the trustee that he was capable of managing his affairs, the trustee should reconvey to
the settlor; but that if the settlor could not satisfy the trustee
of his ability to manage his affairs properly, the trust should
continue for an additional five years under the same conditions, and at the expiration of the extended period the
trustee should reconvey to the settlor. It was further provided
that if the settlor should die "at any time before my said trustees reconvey said premises to me" without having wife or
children, the trustee should sell the property and pay the
proceeds to the settlor's father and mother in specified proportions. No reconveyance was ever made by the trustee to
the settlor, and apparently the settlor was unable, or made
no effort, to convince the trustee of his competence to handle
his own interests. Six years fter expiration of the ten-year
period marked out by the trust instrument, the settlor made
his will leaving all his property, with the exception of small
legacies, to a cousin. The following year he died and the
will was admitted to probate. This action was brought by
29. 170 S. C. 373, 170 S. E. 429 (1933).
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the heirs of the father, who had predeceased the settlor, to
set aside a deed made by the trustee to the devisee cousin
after the probating of the will. The plaintiffs' contention was
that the father had acquired an interest under the trust deed
which could not be frustrated by the settlor's will.
In its decision adverse to the plaintiffs the court held,
in the first place, that the trust was active for a ten-year
period, but became passive upon the period's expiration, and
that the Statute of Uses put the legal title thereupon in the
settlor. The court concluded that while a duty to convey would
make the trust active-taking it out of the Statute of Usesa duty to reconvey would not have that effect.2 0 Further, and
more relevantly, the court held:
"But had the Statute not executed the use, there can
be no doubt that the donor was the sole beneficiary or
cestui quo trust after the termination of the second fiveyear period. The express trust having terminated, there
was a resulting trust in favor of the original donor,
and the original trustee held the legal title in trust for
him. * *
"Since the original donor was the equitable owner of
the trust property, he could have required the trustee
to convey the property at any time he may have so desired. Being the equitable owner of the trust property,
he had the right to dispose thereof by will, whether he
held the legal title or not. * * He devised and bequeathed
all his property and his estate of every kind whatsoever
(with exception of the specific legacies) to the defendant
(the cousin) * * absolutely and in fee simple. This was
sufficient to transmit the property embraced in the trust
deed to (the cousin) * * whether the testator had legal
title to the property or not."
The Restatement of Trustss summarizes the matter:
"The beneficiary of a resulting trust, like a beneficiary
of an express trust, can transfer his interest by a testamentary disposition if, but only if, the requirements of
the statute relating to wills are complied with."
30. The writer, with uncharacteristic restraint, refrains from commenting on the soundness or unsoundness of the distinction.
31. Sec. 407(1), comm. d.
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If the beneficiary of a resulting trust may transmit his interest by will, there is no reason to suppose that the benefici-

ary of a constructive trust may not do likewise. Just as devisees may seek to rescind a conveyance obtained by fraud
upon their testator,3 so, apparently,-since the relief sought
is substantially the same-may devisees seek to have a constructive trust imposed upon property obtained from the tes-

tator by fraud or under such other circumstances as would
give rise to such a trust.33

Death of a Co-Beneficiary
The interests of co-beneficiaries may arise originally under any of the recognized categories of trusts: express, resulting or constructive. Or they may arise upon the death of

a single beneficiary through descent or testamentary gift to
them. Trusts interests, to repeat the language of Heath v.
Bishop,M "may be held in severalty, in joint-tenancy, coparcenery and in common."

Where beneficiaries own as tenants in common, it follows
necessarily that on the death of one his interest will pass to

his heirs or administrator if he dies intestate, to his devisees
or executor if he dies testate, under the principles discussed
in the two preceding sections.3 Instances of co-beneficiaries
are too commonplace to require citation of authority.
32. Bemis v. Waters, 170 S. C. 432, 170 S. E. 475 (1938). The devisees here brought an action in tort against a grantee from their mother,
the testatrix, alleging fraud in the procurement of the deed. The action
was dismissed on the ground that the cause of action for the fraud
itself which had been committed upon the grantor died with her, and
that the Survival Act (Sec. 419, S. C. Code of Laws 1942) would not
preserve it. The court suggested that a suit in equity to set aside the
transfer would be appropriate.
33. Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, See. 472. In All v. Prillaman, 200
S. C. 279, 20 S. E. (2d) 741, 159 A. L. R. 981 (1942), the action was
to impress a constructive trust upon property deeded to the defendant
by his and the complainants' mother, the testatrix, as a result of an
allegedly fraudulent promise. The conveyed land was specifically devised to the complainants. The suit was unsuccessful on the merits,
and it was held that the testatrix, having irrevocably parted with the
land, could not defeat the grant by her will. No point was made as
to the legal availability of the relief to the complaining devisees.
34. Note 6 supra, To substantially the same effect: Restatement of
Trusts, Sec. 113, comm. c; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 113; Bogert on Trusts
and Trustees, Sec. 181.
35. See Restatement of Trusts, See. 143; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 143.
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The proposition that equitable estates may be held in joint
tenancy must, of course, be considered in the light of applicable joint tenancy statutes. The South Carolina statute s3
provides:
"Where any person shall be, at the time of his or her
death, seized or possessed of any estate in joint tenancy,
the same shall be adjudged to be severed by the death of
the joint tenant, and shall be distributed as if the same
were a tenancy in common."
Without critically analyzing the statute to determine
whether the statute abolishes joint tenancies out and out, or
merely eliminates the presumption of a joint tenancy, or preserves joint tenancies and only does away with the incident
of survivorship,37 it is reasonably certain that where there is a
transfer inter vivos or by will to a transferee for the benefit of
A and B-on the death of either, the heirs, devisees or personal representatives of the decedent will take a share as
3
tenants in common with the survivor.
Whether the statute will permit the owner of property to
create a joint tenancy with the retention of the attribute of
Survivorship, as where there is a grant or devise to "A and B
and to the survivor of them"; is a question that will merely
be posed but not discussed here. Suffice it to say, if it is permissible in the creation of a legal estate, it is permissible in
the case of a trust estate, and if there is a survivorship in the
one case, there can be a survivorship in the other.
The same general observations may be indulged in with
class gifts. The problem is not so much whether equitable
interests are in a different category if the gift is a class gift,
36. See. 8911, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
37. The cases indicate that joint tenancies are not abolished as such,
only the feature of survivorship. Herbemont v. Thomas, Cheves' Equity
21 (1839); Ball v. Deas, 2 Strobhart's Equity 24 (1848); Telfair v.
Howe, 3 Richardson's Equity 235, 55 Am.Dec. 637 (1851). The first two
of these cases hold that the statute applies only to vested interests:
and where in a will there is simply a gift to A and B, without such
intent-manifesting words as "in equal shares" or like terms indicating
division into equal or other specified portions, and one of the donees
dies before the testator, the survivor takes the entire estate. To the
same effect is Free v. Sandifer, 131 S. C. 232, 126 S. E. 521 (1924).
38. For an instance of this in a trust estate, see McMeekin v. Brummet, 2 Hill's Equity 638 (1837).
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but whether the gift is truly a class gift, and if so who the
members of the class are, and as of what time the class is to
be determined.9 The death of a member of the class will produce no substitution of his heirs, devisees or personal representatives in his place but will result in an accretion to the
remaining members of the class; and this should be true
whether the interest affected is legal or equitable.O
Dower
It is axiomatic that dower does not attach to equitable
estates.4 ' This is the rule at common law. In many states the
rule has been changed by statute. No such reversing statute
has been adopted in South Carolina. The cases hereafter discussed make it plain that there is adherence to the common
law. The relevant significance of the stated rule is that dower
does not attach to the estates of deceased trust beneficiaries.
The Restatement2 expresses the principle:
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, the widow
of the beneficiary of a trust of land is not entitled to
dower in his interest."
Other authorities make the same statement,4 , and the
South Carolina cases, hereafter treated, all point the same
way.
In its relation to dower the formula that equity follows
the law, and that the same consequences are visited upon
equitable as upon legal estates, breaks down. This singular,
and exceptional, circumstance stems from an early judicial
concern for the integrity of titles acquired on the strength of
39. For an exhaustive discussion of the local law of class gifts, see
Class Gifts in South Carolina, by Philip Wilmeth, Year Book of the

Selden Society, Vol. IX, Part 1, p. 16 (1947).
40. For an example of a class gift in trust, see Buist v. Walton, 104
S. C. 95, 88 S. E. 357 (1915), where all the members of the class which

was to take on the life tenant's death predeceased the life tenant and
the class interest was thereby dstroyed.
41. Tiffany on Real Property (3d Ed.), Sec. 497; Thompson on Real
Property (Perm. Ed.), Sec. 888; 28 C. J. S. 90.

42. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 144.
43. Tiffany on Real Property (3d Ed.), Sec. 497; Thompson on Real
Property (Penn. Ed.), Sec. 888; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th
Ed.), Sec. 990 (a); Scott on Trusts, Sec. 144; Bogert on Trusts and

Trustees, Sec. 186; 28 C. J. S. 94.
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the accepted principle that dower did not attach to trust
estates. It was a rule of property that the courts decided
to respect.
"The difficulty in which the courts of equity have
been involved, with respect to dower, I apprehend,
originally arose thus: They had assumed as a principle
in acting upon trusts to follow the law; and according
to this principle, they ought, in all cases where rights
attached on legal estates, to have attached the same
rights upon trusts; and consequently to have given dower
of an equitable estate. It was found, however, that in
cases of dower this principle, if pursued to the utmost,
would affect title to a large proportion of the estates in
the country; for that parties had been acting on the footing of dower, upon a contrary principle, and had supposed that by the creation of a trust the right of dower
would be prevented from attaching. Many persons had
purchased under the idea; and the country would have
been thrown into the utmost confusion if courts of equity
had followed their general rule with respect to trusts in
case of dower.""
A South Carolina case5 gives the same basis for the
anomaly:
"It became very important that the English courts
in perfecting such (trust) settlements, should attach to
them every possible incident of legal estates. They, therefore, allowed curtesy in trust estates, and would also
have allowed dower therein, but could not do it, because
thereby too many estates would have been unsettled."
An early case dealing with a genuine equity of redemption
0
under a mortgage given prior to 1791 (when the statute4
declaring mortgages to create liens only was adopted) was

44. Lord Chancellor Redesdale in the Irish case of D'Arcy v. Blake,
2 Sch. & Lef. 387 (1805), set out in Scott's Cases on Trusts (3d Ed.)
315. The same explanation is furnished in the comment to Sec. 144,
Restatement of Trusts. See, also, Scott on Trusts, Sec. 144.
45. Withers v. Jenkins, note 10 supra. The quoted passage is from
the Circuit Court decree, p. 601.
46. Sec. 8701, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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resolved by assimilation to a trust estate. In Verree v.
Verree,47 a purchaser, while unmarried, bought land, assuming a pre-1791 mortgage. He thereafter married. Later he
died, with the mortgage unpaid. The complainant, his widow,
demanded dower, but the court held that the mortgage, given
prior to the statute, passed the fee to the mortgagee, leaving
in the mortgagor only an equity of redemption, which was
all that the husband had acquired on his purchase; that,
although the widow might redeem, she was not dowable in
an estate of which her husband did not have legal seisin. The
court said:
"It has been finally settled, by several concurrent decisions in equity, that the wife shall not be endowed of a
trust estate of inheritance, or of an equity of redemption* * The wife of a cestui que wse was not dowable at common law; nor since the Statute of Uses is she dowable
of a trust."
A trust interest being a species of equitable interest, it
follows that cases dealing with other types of equitable interests, such as the interest of a vendee under contract of sale,
furnish precedent and example for the trust interest. The
vendor-vendee relationship is particularly an apt source of
reference in the light of the recurring thesis that the vendor
is a trustee and the vendee a beneficiary.48
There are at least three very definite cases in which dower
has been denied to the widows of vendees of land who had not
perfected their purchases by acquisition of the legal title. In
Secrest v. McKenn, 4 9 a vendee under a contract of sale lost
the property (upon which he had made considerable improvements) at a forced sale by the Commissioner in Equity
to satisfy obligations, the interest being sold to the vendor.
On the vendee's death his widow demanded dower. The demand was refused:
"Dower is a legal right, and can attach only on a
legal seizin of the husband during the coverture. * * If
(the vendee) had, at any time, during the coverture, a
47. 2 Brevard's Law 211 (1807).
48. See notes 11 and 12 supra and text thereto.
49. 6 Richardson's Equity 72 (1853).
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legal seizin, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree; if not, the
defendant must be dismissed."
In Bowman v. Bailey the husband of the demandant
widow was co-partner with another in a firm which owned
land. The husband bought out the co-partner's interest but did
not take a deed from him. The defendant purchased the land
from the husband, taking a deed from both partners, under
an arrangement that dispensed with the other partner's
making a deed to the husband and then having the husband
make a deed of a single interest to the purchaser. The deed
carried no renunciation of dower. The widow's claim of dower
was denied except as to the one-half interest her husband
originally owned and retained. Although the husband had
bought and paid for his co-partner's interest, the absence of
legal seisin was considered fatal to the widow's claim. 1
The case of Morgan v. SmithM reaches the same result as
the two preceding cases. A vendee died before completing payment of the purchase price and before the acquisition of legal
title. The balance was paid by his heirs or legal representatives after his death. The vendee had himself contracted to
sell part of the land to another. After the vendee's death an
action was brought by his purchaser to compel performance.
The suit resulted in a deed to the purchaser, who thereafter
conVeyed the land to the defendant. The court denied dower
to the original vendee's widow. Some stress was laid upon the
fact that the vendee had not paid the entire purchase price
before his death, but the broader ground upon which the
court acted was, again, the husband's lack of legal seisin.
The cases go far detailed do not touch upon trust estates
as such. The paucity of cases upon this precise point may be
attributed to the early and readily accepted notion, treated
as not open to controversy, that trust estates are not subject
50. 20 S. C. 550 (1883).
51. It might be remarked, collaterally, that partnership real property
is converted, in equity, into personal property to the extent that it may
be needed for the satisfaction of partnership debts and the adjustment
of partnership equities. Until these have been accomplished the widow
of a deceased partner is not entitled to dower. Only so much of the real
estate, or the balance of proceeds of sale, remaining after the payment of debts and the settlement of accounts is amenable to dower.
Bowman v. Bailey, note 50 aupra; Schenk v. Lewis, 125 S. C. 228, 118

S. E. 631 (1928).

52. 25 S. C.887 (1886).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss4/7

18

Karesh: Devolution of Interests in Trust Estates

REvIEW SECTION
to dower. Two cases, however, make necessary mention of the
proposition and may be considered ample and direct authority
for the rule. In Milledge v. Larmar, 3 a grantor conveyed land
to his natural son, to take effect upon the donor's death, but
if the son should die without heirs of the body, then the property was to go to children of the donor's brothers. Afterwards
the donor confirmed the deed by will. The contest was between
the children of the donor's brothers and the widow of the
grantee, who had died testate and without issue. The widow
claimed under her husband's will. The court held that the
limitation over to the brother's children was not too remote,
and that the widow acquired no interest in the land under
her husband's will. The case was then resolved into a consideration of the validity of the deed itself, an assault being
made upon it as improperly attempting to create an estate
in futuro, i.e., upon the donor's death. The contention was dismissed, the court sustaining the deed as a covenant to stand
seised to uses. Here the question of dower arose in two aspects: (1) whether dower was available in an estate in fee
simple conditional, where the tenant died without issue, (2)
whether, if so, it was available under a covenant to stand
seised. After deciding in favor of dower under the first aspect
(a view open to criticism) ,5 the court looked at the problem:
"But a more serious objection to the claim of dower
exists. It is that a widow is not dowable of a trust estate;
and that this was construed a deed to stand seized to uses
by the court. There is no doubt that the decided cases
have settled the point too long and too firmly to be shaken,
that a widow is not dowable of a trust estate."
The court then concluded, however, that it would not construe such a covenant to stand seised to be one to all intents
and purposes, and that it would be utilized only so far as
necessary to sustain the purposes of the transfer; that there
was no genuine trust; and that dower, therefore, should be
allowed. As a hedge the court. sustained the deed as a valid
testamentary disposition by reason of incorporation into the
confirmatory will of the grantor. While it is probably correct
to say that dower is not defeated by the circumstance that a
covenant to stand seised to uses, erecting an equitable interest
53. 4 DeSaussure's Equity 617 (1816).
54. See Restatement of Property, Sec. 54.
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in the grantee, has been created, it is difficult to understand
why the court did not declare that the Statute of Uses had
executed the use, putting a legal estate in the grantee, thereby
cutting out the impediment offered by the possible equitable
character of the interest.
The second, and more important, case is Spann v. Carson.f
The will out of which the suit arose disposed of the testator's
residuary estate among his children. The share to a son,
James, was given in trust "so that the portions or shares
allotted to my son, James, shall not be subject to his disposal
or liable for his debts." Similar trust provisions were inserted
for the other children. The will further provided that if any
child should die not leaving a child who should marry or
reach twenty-one, his or her estate should go to named grandchildren. The beneficiary James died without issue, and his
widow claimed dower. The issue was made by the court to
depend upon whether the devised estate was legal or equitable.
The lower court decided that the sole duty of the trustee being
merely that of holding the legal title to protect the estate
against the beneficiary's debts, that duty was not sufficient
to make the trust an active one or otherwise keep the Statute
of Uses from operating. The plain inference is that had the
estate been equitable, dower would not have attached:
"Now it is not here contended that a widow is dowable in a trust estate, for without a statute to that effect
the authorities are unanimous in holding the opposite
view."
Having thus concluded that the estate devised was a legal
fee simple, defeasible, it was adjudged that the widow was
entitled to dower. The majority of the Supreme Court agreed
with and affirmed the lower court decree for the reasons therein stated. In a separate opinion Justice Cothran concurred
through a different line of reasoning, but with him, too, the
pivotal issue was the character of the estate:
"There appears to be no contest over the proposition
that if James C. Spann took under the will a legal, fee
simple defeasible estate, the widow is entitled to dower
in the land so held by him. It scarcely needs authority
55. 123 S. C. 371, 116 S. E. 7 (1922).
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for the well-established rule that a widow is not dowable
of a trust estate."
An intermediate case reaching the same result is Peay v.
Peay,56 where the distinction between the two types of estates
and their relation to dower are made manifest. There, a conveyance was to a trustee "in trust for the use of A. P., his
heirs and assigns forever, and to permit the said A. P. to have
and possess the same, and to enjoy the profits thereof, and in
trust to convey the same to such person or persons as the
said A. P. shall, by deed or will, or other writing under his
hand, direct and appoint." It was held that the beneficiary
had a qualified and terminable fee, that the Statute of Uses
made the estate legal, and that the appointment never having
been made, the fee became absolute and simple. The estate,
being legal and not having terminated by appointment, was
held to be subject to the widow's dower. The stress upon
the legal character of the estate is, of course, reflective of the
unexpressed tenet that dower is absent from an equitable
estate.
As for dower in the interest of the husband under a resulting trust, no South Carolina cases seem to generate the
issue. The authorities generally indicate that only to the extent that dower is available in the interest under an express
trust is it available under a resulting trust.57 Therefore, in
those jurisdictions in which dower is held not to attach to
the interest of the husband in an express trust, dower is likewise denied where the trust is resulting. The consequence,
obviously, in South Carolina is that dower does not attach
to interests under a resulting trust. Likewise, dower cannot
attach where the interest is involved in a constructive trust.6
Curtesy
The common law estate or tenancy by the curtesy is defined as "the estate to which a husband is entitled, upon the
56. 2 Richardson's Equity 409 (1845).
57. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 407(2), comm. e; 28 C. J. S. 95.
58. Scott on Trusts, Sec. 462.5; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sec.
186. Scott takes the position that even in a jurisdiction which may
permit dower to attach to equitable interests, the interest arising out of
a constructive trust does not form such an estate as will permit dower.
Bogert views the interest as a chose in action, to which obviously dower
cannot attach.
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death of his wife, in lands and tenements of which she was
seized in fee simple or fee tail during coverture, provided
they have lawful issue, born alive, which might have been
capable of inheriting the estate. It is a freehold estate for the
term of his natural life." 9 Unlike dower, it has remained in
the ambit of the equity follows the law principle, and in
jurisdictions in which curtesy has been allowed to persist,
it will attach to the equitable estate of the deceased wife,
provided the conditions for its creation otherwise exist.6D For
reasons not necessary to detail here, the courts held that, contrary to the situation presented by dower, titles would not be
harmed or unsettled -by permitting curtesy to cling to equitable estates, and the maxim was allowed to operate unhampered in this respect.
In a satisfyingly brief statute,6' the Legislature, in 1883,
decreed:
"That from and aiter'the passage of this act the tenancy by the courtesy (sic) shall not exist in this State."
It is clear that since the passage of the statute, curtesy no
longer exists as a concomitant of either legal or equitable
estates. Some observations are in order, however, as to its
status prior to that time. That curtesy existed in the abstract
as to equitable estates is made clear by reference to Vertee
,P. Verree,612 which contrasts the denial of dower with the
allowance of curtesy.
Whether the estate by curtesy existed at all after the enactment of the Statute of Descent and Distributiona in 1791,
6 the court, withwas a matter of debate. In Gray V. GiveMM.
out comment on the score, gave a surviving husband an
election between curtesy and a distributive share as an heir
59. Withers v. Jenkins, note 10 supra, quoting from Washburn on

Real Property (....Ed.) 148.
60. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 145; Scott on Trusts, See. 145; Bogert
on Trusts and Trustees, See. 186; Tiffany on Real Property (3d Ed.),
Sec. 558; 25 C. J. S. 50.
61. 18 Stat. 389, now codified as Sec. 8577, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
The code section is even briefer. The word used there is also "courtesy",
a spelling rarely used, and seldom found in the South Carolina cases.
62. Note 47 supra.
63. 5 Stat. 162, now in amended form Sees. 8905, 8906, S. C. Code
pf Laws 1942.
64. 2 Hill's Equity 511 (18N).
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at law in a legal fee simple estate. In Wright v. Herron,6 a
husband was allowed curtesy in the legal fee conditionalestate
of his wife. The matter was definitely settled as to fee simple
estates by two decisions, Gaffney v. Peeler,6 and Frost v.
67
Frost,
both holding that curtesy did not exist in fee simple
estates, an interpretation made necessary, according to the
court, to give full and sensible effect to the Statute of Descent
and Distribution. A distinction was drawn between the fee
simple and the fee conditional, for the purposes of the case,
in the fact that the statute then referred in express terms
to the descent of estates owned in fee simple; and in that the
decision in Wright v. Herrons and the intermediate decision
in Withers v. Jenkins, 9 hereafter discussed, were limited to
fees conditional, not affected by the statute.
In the case last mentioned the question arose whether a
husband had an estate by curtesy in the equitable fee conditional estate of the wife, who had had a child which had
predeceased her. The court admitted:
"We have already seen that there is no difference between legal and equitable estates as to their general incidents and qualities, and consequently it would seem,
that when curtesy would attach to a legal estate, it
should also attach to an equitable one of the same quantity and character."
The outcome of the case, however, was adverse to the husband, because there was not such seisin in fact as well as in
deed as was necessary to support the estate (the wife never
having been in possession nor having received the rents and
profits from the trustee); and, further, because the whole
tenor of the trust instrument displayed a purpose to exclude
curtesy-an intent which, under the law, could and should
be respected.70

65. 5 Richardson's Equity 441 (1853); 6 Richardson's Equity 406

(1854).
66. 21 S. C. 55 (1883).
67. 21 S. C. 501 (1884).
68. Note 65 supra.
69. Note 10 supra.
70. Under the authority in this case, curtesy was allowed in a legal
fee conditional estate in Odom v. Beverly, note 17 supra.
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II
THE TRUSTEE'S TITLE

A maxim that has been accurately described by a South
Carolina jurist u' as "one of the 'mud-sills' of chancery" is that
equity will not permit a trust to fail for want of a trustee.
The Restatement's 72 generalization is:
"Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the
trust, ff a trust has been created the trust will not fail
when the person designated as trustee ceases for any
reason to be trustee."
Whatever the cause of the trustee's wanting, the trust will
not fail on that account,73 unless, indeed, the trust instrument
should contain the unlikely provision, or be so construed, that
the fate of the trust follows that of the trustee. 4 Trust
powers may be created of so personal a character that only
the trustee named by the settlor can execute them, and the
trust may end for that reason. Even where there is a successor trustee appointed by the court, some of the duties imposed may be of such a nature as to be exercisable only by the
71. Acting Associate Justice Grimball, in Leaphart v. Harmon, 186
S. C. 362, 195 S. E. 628 (1938).
72. Restatement of Trusts, See. 101.
73. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 101, comm. a; Scott on Trusts, See.
101. Shields v. Jolly, 1 Richardson's Equity 99, 42 Am. Dec. 349 (1844),
generally; Dawson v. Dawson, Rice's Equity 243 (1839), disclaimer;
Chaplin v. Givens, Rice's Equity 132 (1839), disclaimer; Cloud v. Calhoun, 10 Richardson's Equity 358 (1858), disclaimer; Withers v. Jenkins, 6 S. C. 122 (1874), disclaimer; Leaphart v. Harmon, note 71 auvra,
disclaimer; EV Parte Trustees of Greenville Academies, 7 Richardson's
Equity 471 (1854), corporate and other incapacity; Cooper v. Day, 1
Richardson's Equity 26 (1844), removal; Lewis v. Mew, 1 Strobhart's
Equity 180 (1846), removal; Dickerson v. Smith, 17 S. C. 289 (1881),
removal; Cathcart v. Jennings, 137 S. C. 450, 137 S. E. 588 (1926),
mental incapacity; See. 9046, S. C. Code of Laws 1942, resignation.
There are undoubtedly many other cases involving change of trustee
personnel; the action of the courts in thus effecting the change is indication enough of the proposition that elimination of the original trustee
does not put an end to the trust.
In charitable trusts, aside from inherent power, the court is authorized to appoint successor trustees in the event of vacancies,
trustees where the trust instrument does not name any,
the power conferred is discretionary and selective: Sec.
Code of Laws 1942.
74. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 101, comm. b; 65 C. J.
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named predecessor and to that extent the new trustee may be
denied these powers.75
The equitable safeguard against collapse of the trust is
especially apt and necessary when the trustee dies before
the completion of his task; and the South Carolina cases are
at pains to utilize the principle in this situation. 76 In Reynolds
v. Reynolds,77 it is said:
"The death of a trustee named in a deed does not destroy the trust. The court of equity will keep it alive as
long as any duty as trustee shall remain."
The trustee may die, but the trust lives; and nothing is
plainer than that on the trustee's death, the separation of
legal and equitable interest survives. The beneficiary continues
to have only an equitable interest, just as he had before. The
legal interest is elsewhere.
Unless the trust instrument itself provides for a successor
trustee, the logical and normal step to take is to apply to the
court of equity for the appointment of a successor. The power
of the court to grant the relief is unquestioned." The process
of filling the vacancy caused by death is simple and may be
merely ex pcrte on petition, and this without regard to
whether the trustee died testate or intestate.9 The beneficiaries must make, or be made parties to, the application, but
the presence of the holder of the legal title is not required.
Presumably the reason for the permitted omission of the
holder of that title is that at best he is not much more than
75. Singleton v. Cuttino, 105 S. C. 44, 89 S. E. 385 (1916).
76. Mendenhall v. Mower, 16 S. C. 303 (1881); Sullivan v. Latimer,
35 S. C. 422, 17 S. E. 701 (1891); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 61 S. C. 243,
39 S. E. 391 (1901); Cone v. Cone, note 4 suprz; Knight v. Jones, 93
S. C. 376, 76 S. E. 978 (1912); DuBose v. Kell, 105 S. C. 89, 89 S. E.
.555 (1916); Highland Park Mnfg. Co. v. Steele, 232 Fed. 10 (C.C.A. 4,
W.D.S.C.-1916). There are numerous other cases in which the court,
in appointing successor trustees, makes no point of the maxim but
obviously rests its action upon it.
77. Note 76 supra.
78 See the cases in notes 73 and 76 supra.
79. Ex Parte Knust, Bailey's Equity 489 (1831) ; Gibbes v. R. R. Co.,
13 S. C. 228 (1879); Sullivan v. Latimer, note 76 supra; Cone v. Cone,
note 4 supra. To remove a trustee, other than supplanting the trustee
who occupies through the death of his predecessor, or to effect a resignation, suit must be by bill (complaint), and the trustee to be removed
must be made a party. Ex Parte Tunno, Bailey's Equity 395 (1831);
Wallace v. Foster, 15 S. C. 214 (1880) ; Cone v. Cone, note 4 supra.
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a repository of the title, upon whom the law has cast that
title to keep it from being in abeyance or in a state of awkward suspension.80 His presence is scarcely to be required if
his consent to being stripped of the title is not needed, and his
dissent would be, as it must, an ineffectual gesture.8 '
Upon the filling of the vacancy caused by death, the decree
of appointment has the effect of transferring the title and
powers of the deceased trustee to his appointed successor,
without the necessity of a formal transfer by the displaced
holder of the legal title or a transfer by an officer of the
court.8 Nor is the prior consent of the trustee to be substituted a requisite.8
In the period between the death of the trustee and the
transference of title and powers, what of the powers of the
interregnum holder of the title? The question of who acquires
the legal title on death will be the chief burden of this discourse hereafter. In the meantime, it must be stated that the
fact of title does not establish the fact of the existence of
powers. A trust is founded upon personal confidence reposed
in the one selected by the settlor to fill the office, and it would
hardly be supposed that the settlor would rely upon the blind
chance that the inheritor of the legal title might be as good
as, or better than, the person he had himself selected for
his individual qualities. That the holder of the title has some
duties is reasonably clear, but his incapacity to administer
the trust, at least in its affirmative aspects, is barely open
to question. Yet here it must be admitted that there are
curious, if unimportant, contradictions in the authorities.
Bogertf comments that, because the successor in title has
not been selected by the settlor, he is not qualified to act and
may be displaced, but he adds:

80. Dean v. Langford, 9 Richardson's Equity 423 (1857); Cone v.
Cone,'note 4 supra
81. Gibbes v. R. R. Co., note 79 supra.
82. Watson v. Pitts, 2 Mc]fullan's Law 298 (1842); McNish v. Guerard, 4 Strobbart's Equity 66 (1850); Sullivan v. Latimer, note 76 supra;
Kirton v. Howard, note 19 8upra; Sec. 9046, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
The applicability of this statute has been questioned as to the filling of
vacancies caused other than through resignation: Davant v. Guerard?
1 Speers' Law 242 (1843).
83. Kirton v. Howard, note 19 supra.
84. Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 529.
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"Nevertheless, in the meantime the legal successor
in title is trustee both in fact and in law. He is charged
with the duty of executing the trust according to the
terms of the trust instrument in precisely the same manner as his testator, intestate or ancestor was."
A seemingly different view or perhaps a difference in
emphasis, is taken by Scott,8 who makes the flat assertion
that the interim trustee has no power to administer the trust.
There is a coincident position in the Restatement.8
The language of the South Carolina cases, all admitting
that the inheritor of the legal title may be displaced as a
matter of course, is interesting. In Ex ParteKnust,87 in speaking of an executrix who succeeded to her deceased husband's
title, the court observed:
"In strictness, the office was not vacant in this instance, for the trust devolved on the executrix. Yet a
trust must be regarded in some degree as a personal confidence, and the court will more readily transfer it, when it
has devolved on a stranger to the cestuy que trust."
In DuRant v. DuRant,8s where the trustee died intestate
and his son succeeded to his title, the court, after calling attention to the devolution of the title, stated:
"Such being the case, the plaintiff was compelled by
law to discharge any duty incident to the trust, and if at
any time he failed to do so, the Court of Equity would
compel him to do so. * * If at any time in the discharge
of the duties of his office, it becomes necessary to obtain
the directions of the court, it is competent for him to do
so voluntarily, but if the exigencies of his trust require
action on his part to protect or preserve the property
confided to his keeping and he refuses or neglects to do
so, the court, on a proper application, will enforce such
action on his part."
Within the framework of the facts of the case, the quoted
remarks are reasonably apropos, but it is doubtful that they
85. Scott on Trust, Sees. 104, 105.
86. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 104, comm. a; Sec. 105, comm. a. And
accord: 54 Am. Jur. 91, 237.
87. Note 79 supra. There is similar language in Gibbes v. R. R. Co.,
note 79 supra.
88. 36 S. C. 49, 14 S. E. 391 (1891).
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could extend to cases where the trustee was given an appreciable amount of discretion, or clothed with a power of
sale, or charged with the duty of management and investment.
There are, of course, cases where the mere passive retention of the title by the holder serves the purposes of the trust,
as with -the old trust for a married woman, and the trust to
preserve contingent remainders. Here a duty is performed by
inaction. And a case can be presented of a trust where there is
merely a duty to convey the trust property to designated
beneficiaries at a particular time. If the trustee has died in
the meantime, his successor in title can, with all propriety,
convey the trust property at the appointed time to the beneficiaries and thereby fulfil the functions of the trust. Or he
may, with, and perhaps without, the consent of the beneficiaries, bring action, as holder of title, against third persons
in wrongful possession;89 and undoubtedly he may be joined
as a party defendant in a suit involving the rights of the
beneficiaries among themselves 90 or in a suit against third
parties.91 None of these courses of action can be objected to
as an improper administration of the trust.
Finally, in Cone v. Cone,92 it is said, concerning one who
has succeeded to title on the trustee's death:
"It might be a grave question whether the heir at law
in such case could be required to perform the duties of
trustee."
To revert to the main theme-the course of the trustee's
title: logically, the course of transmission of title on the trustee's death should be the same as if he were the holder of the
legal title free of trust. In a sense, he is the owner of the
property, subject to an equitable obligation to another. Without regard to the niceties of the in personam and in rem
theories of trusts, the fact remains that, substantially, the
trustee's legal title is his to do with as he chooses. The equity
of the beneficiary is eliminated if the trustee transfers the
89. DuRant v. DuRant, note 88 supra; Delleney v. Winnsboro Granite
Co., 72 S. C. 39, 51 S. E. 531 (1905).
90. Huckabee v. Newton, 23 S. C. 291 (1885).
91. Moyle v. Campbell, 131 S. C. 166, 127 S. E. 363 (1924) ; Breeden
v. Moore, 82 S. C. 534, 64 S. E. 604 (1909) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, note
76 supra.
92. Note 4 supra.
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trust property pursuant to the terms of the trust, or if, in
breach of trust, the trustee conveys to one who can quailfy
as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice; the equity
is unaffected if the trustee, in violation of his duty, transfers
to one who cannot so qualify. The course of transmission of
his legal title on his death should be governed by the same
principles: that it should go as if it were his property free of
trust, but subject to the equity of the beneficiary. In the main
these principles do control, and it is stated generally that on
the*death of the trustee his title passes as intestate or teslate
property, precisely as if he were not a trustee, the property
passing, subject to the trust, to the personal representatives,
heirs or devisees, as the case may be.93 They, of course, are
not bona fide purchasers for value without notice. South Carolina law has, however, some notable exceptions, as will be seen
further on.
Death of the Trustee Intestate
Personal Property. The authorities, including those last,
noted, make it clear that on the death of the trustee intestate
the title to personal property, subject of the trust, passes to
his administrator. The appointment, of course, relates back
to the time of death, and the administrator may be regarded
as taking as of the earlier time. It may happen, however, that
there is no administration on the deceased trustee's estate,
and in such a case it would be hard to say just where the
title was; but the question in all likelihood would become mootby the reclaiming of the property by the beneficiaries or by
a substituted trustee. The trust property is, naturally, no part
of the assets of the deceased trustee's estate: it is not subject
to distribution among his distributees, nor is it available for
the payment of his debts-this under the accepted proposition
-that property of a fiduciary passing on death to his representative reaches the latter's hands subject to interests and equities of the third persons for whom the fiduciary was acting,
whether the fiduciary had title to the property or not.M Ob93. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 104 (intestacy), Sec. 105 (testacy);
Scott on Trusts, Secs. 104, 105; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sec.

529; 65 C. J. 637.
94. 23 C. J. 1150; 21 Am. Jur. 483; City Council v. Duncan, 3 Breyard's Law 386 (1813), agent; McIntyre v. McClenaghan, 12 S. C. 185
(1879), agent. In both these cases the court speaks.of the agent as
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viously, too, the administrator can administer only his decedent's estate. It has already been pointed out that as successor in title he does not succeed to his predecessor's powers,
nor is he subject to the original duties imposed in the creation
of the trust.
There are, no doubt, many South Carolina cases in which
there has been the fact of the trustee's dying intestate, followed by administration, but there appear to be none in which
the question seems to have been debated. It is to be assumed
that the'underlying principle is taken for granted.96 There
are several cases involving executors of deceased trustees,
where the principle is identical, and they will be noted hereafter.
Personal property held by one under a resulting or a constructive trust passes to the administrator of the intestate
trustee, subject, of course, to the trust and recoverable by
the persons beneficially entitled.9 6
Rec Property.It has already been shown that, stated generally, real property held in trust passes to the heirs at law
of the intestate trustee, subject to the trust.
trustee, under the facts. Gary v. Bank, 26 S. C. 538, 2 S. E. 568, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 733 (1886), guardian; Bagwell v. Hinton, 205 S. C. 377, 32
S. E. (2d) 147 (1944), guardian. It is, of course, accepted law that
the administrator of a deceased administrator or executor does not represent the first estate, and the administrator de bonie non may recover
from him the estate property in its original or converted form. Villard
v. Robert, 1 Strobhart's Equity 393 (1847); Rhame v. Lewis, 13 Richardson's Equity 269 (1867).
A striking exception to the principle that the' representative of a
deceased representative has no power with respect to the first estate
is the common law rule that the executor of a deceased executor represents, and becomes the executor of, the first estate--i.e., the estate of
which his testator was executor-and that he can exercise all the powers of the first executor except those of a personal nature. Reeves v.
Tappan, 21 S. C. 1 (1883). The rule was abolished by statute in 1880
(17 Stat. 363; Sec. 8956, S. C. Code of Laws 1942), and the proper
representative of the first estate is the administrator d. b. n. c. t. a.
95. The statement is made in two lower court decrees, both affirmed,
that on death of the trustee intestate the personal property passes to
his personal representative. Martin v. Price, 2 Richardson's Equity 412,
424 (1846)-see the quoted language in the text to note 98 infra; Withers v. Yeadon, 1 Richardson's Equity 324, 327 (1845)-see the text
to note 101 infra.
96. Dominick v. Rhodes, note 20 supra; Duke v. Fulmer, 5 Richardson's Equity 121 (1852).
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In South Carolina, as elsewhere, the title of the intestate
trustee goes by virtue of inheritance from the trustee, but
there is a marked deviation in one respect: the title, instead
of passing to the heirs at law of the deceased trustee under
the Statute of Descent and Distribution, passes to the oldest
son as common law heir. While this is the stock statement, the
true meaning is that the title passes as at common law; and,
if there is no son, then to daughters as coparceners, and so
on, according to the common law canons of descent. So far
as the legal title to trust estates is concerned, the Statute of
Descent and Distribution, whose function it was to root out
the inequities of the common law buttressed on the feudal
system 9 7-with its emphasis on the sex and age of the heirhas been denied operation.
The doctrine that the title to real property of an intestate
trustee descends as at common law had its origin, in 1846, in
the pronouncements of a single Chancellor, Johnstoh, in the
case of Martin v. Price.9 The case is built around a complicated set of facts, which, in substance, were these: A debtor
conveyed property to an assignee for the benefit of his creditors. An undivided one-half was already under mortgage.
The mortgage portion was sold at foreclosure and bought in
by the assignee, who thereafter mortgaged it himself. He
later died intestate, survived by his widow and minor sons
and daughters. The mortgage which he had given was foreclosed, and the mortgaged interest was bought by the widow.
She went into possession and occupied for more than ten years,
asserting ownership of the whole. This action was brought
by a creditor of the original assignor to reach the property,
and the widow countered by alleging complete ownership
in herself. The Chancellor writing the decree in the court
below sustained the claim of the widow, among other reasons
on the ground that, so far as the plaintiff was concerned,
there had been what amounted to a disavowal and termination
of the trust in a prior proceeding marshalling the assets of
the deceased assignor, in which proceeding all creditors, including the plaintiff, were parties, and in which the property
in dispute was not listed or treated as part of the assignor's
estate. This open termination of the trust was held to be the
starting point for adverse holding against the beneficiaries
97. Edwards v. Barksdale, 2 Hill's Equity 416 (1836).
98. Note 95 supra.
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of the trust, and the plaintiff as one of them was barred by
the lapse of time. The lower court decree, which was affirmed,
stated: "The legal title of the real estate was in the heirs of
Price (the assignee), of the personalty in Adger, his administrator."
In his concurring opinion Chancellor Johnston agreed to
the result only on the basis of laches, but he differed as to the
devolution of the title of the assignee-trustee, stating that it
descended to the oldest son as at common law and not to the
heirs at law under the statute. He also gave it as his opinion
that the title having thus descended to the oldest son, his
mother's holding could not be adverse to him, since he was a
minor; but that even if all the heirs, under the statute, including the mother, succeeded to the title, her holding could
not be adverse to her co-trustees. As a matter of fact, whether
the trust descended to the heirs under the Statute of De.
scent and Distribution or went to the common law heir, the
result would have been the same in either ease; and the
Chancellor, cutting short further exploration into the matter,
observed: " * * I forbear to go into them, because too much
time has already been consumed upon a point unnecessary to
the case before us."
Chancellor Johnston's reasoning is worth setting out in
some detail. It is based mainly upon the verbiage of the
Statute of Descent and Distribution in its then and original
form.9 The preamble and enacting words of the statute were:
"WHEREAS: the Convention of this State, by the fifth
section of the tenth article of the Constitution, passed
the third day of June, in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and ninety, did direct that the
Legislature should, as soon as might be convenient, pass
laws for the abolition of the rights of primogeniture, and
for giving equitable distribution of the real estate of
intestates:
"I. Be it therefore enacted, * * That the right of
primogeniture be, and the same is hereby, abolished; and
that when any person possessed of, interested in, or entitled to a real estate in his or her own right in fee simple,
shall die without disposing thereof by will, the same
shall be distributed in the following manner * *
99. 5 Stat. 162 (1791).
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With this language as his starting point, the Chancellor
proceeded:
"Now my opinion is, that 'this has nothing to do with
trust estates, but only concerns the distribution of those
in which the intestate held the beneficiary interest in
his own right.
"We must remember that the object of the Act is to
distribute estates among those interested in them; but
trusts are not created, that the property should be distributed, but that the trusts may be executed. The act
provides only for the distribution of the intestate's own
property; and would be violated noi only in its spirit and
intent but in its letter, if extended to estates not his own.
If this were left doubtful, and resort were had to considerations of mere convenience, these would determine
in favor of the descent at common law, and not under the
statute. Trusts are often of long continuance; being
clogged with limitations and remainders, sometimes determinable at distant periods. In the meantime, by the
death of the trustees, and possibly of their issue, the
trustees (taking the descent to be cast by the statute)
would become so numerous and so widely dispersed, that
it would amount almost to an impossibility, in many
cases, to answer to their duty. On the other hand, the
descent at common law presents a single person, easily
traceable, and easy to be reached. The costs in the one case
would be exorbitant, in the other comparatively inconsiderable.
"It is said, however, that the statute leaves no room
for the descent at common law. That the right of primogeniture is expressly abolished, and that to hold that it
may still exist, in any case is an infraction of the Act of
Assembly; but the purposes for which this right was abolished, as well as the manner and connection in which it
is done, manifest that this would be a very narrow and
imperfect interpretation of the statute-the great purpose of which the solicitude of the convention bears evidence, was that property should be equalized by an organic law. * * But what would the distribution of trust
estates accomplish towards the equalization of the property, or how would it accomplish the great purpose of
the convention?
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"If it be assumed that the right of primogeniture is
unqualifiedly and absolutely abrogated in all cases on the
one hand, it is just as certain,-and by the same mode of
literal constrution,-that the statute only provides for
distributing the individual property of estates on the
other; and, then, as this does not include trust property,
we are brought to the absurd conclusion that the title to
such property does not descend at all: not at common
law, for that descent is abolished; nor under the statute,
because that does not extend to it; a construction not to
be entertained for a moment."
Thus, by reason of the utterances of a single concurring
judge, which did not affect the result of the case in which they
were made, there was initiated a doctrine which sharply departs from fundamental notions as to the devolution of the
trustee's title. The reasons advanced as to the difficulties to
be encountered in the administration of the trust because of
the possibly numerous heirs taking the trustee's title, and
themselves becoming trustees, are not very substantial, since
even then there was no great delay or inconvenience in obtaining a substitute trustee upon simple ex parte application.
No inquiry was even necessary, nor is it to-day, to ascertain
over a period of years who the successive heirs and inheritors
of title might be, if their presence in the proceeding to obtain
a successor was, and is, not necessary. The ex parte practice
had been approved in Ex ParteKnust,1oo fifteen years before,
and that case was based upon apparently long-established
English practice serving as precedent. It is singular that in
the years between 1791, when the Statute of Descent and
Distribution became law, and the opinion of Chancellor Johnston, in 1846, no case had spelled out the precise nature of
the devolution of an intestate trustee's real estate. This circumstance is due, no doubt, to the fact that in most cases
the death of the trustee must have been followed shortly
by the appointment of a successor trustee by the court, and
no problem on this score arose. Yet in the case of Withers v.
Yeadon,'01 decided in 1845, in a decree passed in 1844 by the
same Chancellor Johnston, and reaffirmed on appeal, it was

100. Note 79 supra.
101. Note 95 supra.
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said (concerning a deceased testate trustee and the imposition
of the original trusts upon his successors in title) :
"If the court can regard this power in the light of
an obligatory trust, it can make no sort of difference
whether the legal title of George Wagner, the trustee,
be considered as having vested upon his death, as to
the land, in his heirs (italics supplied) and as to the
slaves in his personal representative, or to have passed
under the will to his wife."
It will thus be seen that Chancellor Johnston entertained
at this time, no notion that heirs, as distinguished from the
common law heir, did not succeed to the trustee's title; and
it cannot be said that in this case he was thinking of the common law heir, because the particular trustee was survived
by a wife and several children, at least one of whom was a
son.
The words in the original statute "when any person possessed of, interested in, or entitled unto a real estate, in his
or her own right (italics supplied) * * "have disappeared
from the statutes and the Code, and there appear now simply
the words: "When any person shall die without disposing of
the same by will, his estate, real and personal, shall be distributed in the following manner * * "102 The disappearance of the
former words, and the substitution of the latter, took place in
the General Statutes of 1882.10s The reason and significance of
their deletion is not clear, but a good case can be made for a
contention that with the vanishing of the original words the
reason for Chancellor Johnston's rule has ceased, and with
it the rule itself; and that, therefore, the statute can be made
to apply to all estates, whether held by the intestate in his
own right or for another. But the cases since the change in
the verbiage of the statute make no mention of this alteration, and it must be presumed that the doctrine remains
inviolate.
The doctrine has been adverted to or applied in a number
of cases since its birth. An early case, Thompson v. DulU,'04
102. Sec. 8906, S. C. Code of Laws 1942. Sec. 8905, taken from the
original statute, provides simply: "The right of primogeniture is abol-

ished."
103. Gen. Stat. (1882), Chap. LX, Sec. 1845.
104. 5 Richardson's Equity 370 (1853).
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following on the heels of Chancellor Johnson's edict, presented the situation of an intestate trustee whose sole heir,
a minor daughter, was compelled by the court to transfer
the trust property to the intended beneficiaries, under the
provisions of the Statute of Ann,10 relating to compulsion
of infant trustees to carry out trusts resting upon them.
Nothing is said in this case of the principle of primogeniture,
but both under the common law and under the Statute of Descent and Distribution, the daughter was the sole heir and successor to title. In Gibbes v. R. R. Co.,'°6 a mortgage of lands
Was given to a trustee, 'his heirs", etc. The mortgagee died
and a substitute was appointed by the court. After the institution of foreclosure, the oldest son of the deceased mortgagee petitioned to be made a party, but his request was
denied because of the prior appointment of a substitute. The
case, on this point, could have been decided on the ground
that the mortgagee's interest was a chattel interest which
did not pass to the petitioner.
Most of the other cases dealing with the matter have to do
with the necessity of the presence of 'the oldest son as trustee
in suits affecting title to the trust property. Huckabee v Newton'0 and Reynolds v. Reynolds'03 were actions for partition
by beneficiaries in which the court held, in each, that the
proceedings were defective for failure to make the oldest son,
0 a proceeding
as trustee, a party. In LeRoy v. City Couni7,C
to sell land derived under a trust was deemed irrigular because of the omission of the "heir-at-law" as a party. In
Moyle v. Campbell,n 0 an action to recover lands from a third
party was dismissed because the oldest son of the deceased
trustee was not a party, even though he was a non-resident.
In Breedin v. Moorep which was an action against a third
party allegedly wrongfully in possession, the court held the
105. 7 Ann c. 19; 2 Stat. 546; Sec. 9063, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
106. Note 79 supra.
107. Note 90 aupra.
108. Note 76 supra.
109. 20 S. C. 71 (1883).
110. Note 91 supra. The court does not suggest how the absent trustee, if he refuses to come in as a plaintiff, can be made a party. Tho
Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 282 (3), states that where the trustee can.
not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court the beneficiary may
proceed in equity against third parties.
111. Note 91 upra.
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action properly maintained because the oldest son was joined
in the action. In DuRant v. DuRant,"' the court condemned
the conduct of beneficiaries in using the name of the oldest
son of the deceased trustee as plaintiff without consultation
with him, but allowed the suit to go on because he had afterwards consented. In Delleney v. Winnsboro Granite Co.,"'
a suit against a third party was saved, against an assertion
of the absence of the trustee, by the circumstance that among
the complainants (who were beneficiaries of a trust) Vas
tle oldest son of the deceased trustee, although he was not
denominated a trustee in the pleadings. In Cone v. Cone,"4
the general statement is made that the title of the intestate
trustee descends to the common law heir, who can be displaced by ex parte proceeding. In Kirkton v. Howard,"5 the
court, after stating the rule, held that a proceeding in a chain
of title which had for its purpose the sale of trust property
and the appointment of a substitute trustee to fill a vacancy
caused by death of the trustee was regular because all the
heirs of the deceased trustee were before the court.
An interesting question of merger was precipitated in the
case of Highland Park Mnfg. Co. v. Steele"6 by the circumstance that the life beneficiarr of the trust was the trustee's
oldest son. The court had before it a deed of one John Steele
conveying property to Joseph A. Steele "in trust * * to stand
seized and possessed of the same for the use and benefit of
my grandson * * John G. Steele, for and during the term
of his natural life, and at his death to transfer and convey
the same to such person or persons, as he, the said John G.
Steele, may by will direct, or in default of such will and direction, to the heirs at law of the said John G. Steele." The
trustee, father of John G. Steele, died intestate, survived
by his widow, his son and five daughters. John G. Steele,
after his father's death, undertook to convey the property in
fee, and by successive conveyances it came to the manufacturing company. Following John G. Steele's death intestate,
the plaintiffs, who were his widow and children, brought action to recover the property, claiming as beneficiaries un112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Note
Note
Note
Note
Note

88 supra.
89 supra.
4 supra.
19 supra.
76 supra.
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der the will of John Steele. The South Carolina Supreme
Court had previously considered the same will in the case of
Steele v. Smi , 7 and it had decided that John G. Steele had
only a life interest; that the rule in Shelley's case did not
apply because the life tenant's estate was legal and the remainder estate was equitable (the latter because of the duty to
convey), the rule being inoperative where the estates were of
different quality. Under the authority of that case, the Circuit Court of Appeals made the same decision in this case.
At this point, however, it was argued that on the death of the
trustee intestate, his oldest son, the life tenant, inherited the
legal title, and, since he was both beneficiary and trustee by
operation of law, there was a merger of the interests, giving
him an absolute legal estate in fee, free of the trust. The
court, while conceding that the trustee's title passed to the
oldest son, the life beneficiary, held that no merger took
place, since equity would prevent it where necessary to carry
out the intent and to preserve the interests of the parties.
Accepting as settled law the major premise that the title
of an intestate trustee of realty passes as at common law,
what happens to the title if the trust is not express, but
,resulting or constructive? Actually, in all these cases, the trustee is not seized "in his own right", and in every one of them
he holds a legal title impressed with an equitable obligation
in favor of someone else. As a sheer abstraction, the same
result should follow in each of these situations, but no case
has ventured to place the implied trust on the same footing
as the express trust, at least not so far as this problem is
concerned, nor has any case touched upon the similarity or
dissimilarity of the types of trusts in this respect. Of the
numerous purchase-money resulting trust cases, there are several where the alleged trustee died intestate. 118 In none of
them did the complainant hazard a suit against the common
law heir alone. The safe course was pursued-suing, or setting up the claim against, all the heirs under the Statute of
Descent and Distribution. Likewise, in suits to impress con117. 84 S. C. 464, 66 S. E. 200, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 939 (1909).
118. Williams v. Hollingsworth, 1 Strobhart's Equity 103, 47 Am.
Dec. 527 (1846); Odom v. Beverly, note 17 supra; Bell v. Edwards,
note 17 8upra; Hutto v. Hutto, 187 S. C. 36, 196 S. E. 375 (1938). For
a case involving a resulting trust arising from failure of the original
trust: Witt v. Carroll, 37 S. C. 388, 16 S. E. 130 (1892).
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structive trusts upon lands held by an intestate, the statutory
heirs were the parties- 9
It would be belaboring the point to argue the matter as
it affects the synthetic trustee fashioned out of the vendorvendee relationship. On the death intestate of the vendortrustee, his estate descends, subject to the equity of the
vendee; but it would not be erroneous to assert that none of
the suits seeking specific performance against the successors
in interest of the deceased vendor have limited the defendants
to the oldest son or other common law heir. Such a course, it is
hardly necessary to say, is not to be recommended.
It may be argued that it is logical to separate the two
classes of trust-the express and the implied-and that there
can be no difficulty, because of the clear distinction in their
respective characters. But a case can be imagined where even
under an express trust trouble may arise. A conveys land to
B by deed absolute on its face but on a trust for C, separately
declared in writing by B. The writing, which will satisfy the
Statute of Frauds relating to the establishment of trusts,120
is not recorded. Thereafter B dies intestate. He is survived
by his widow, his sole heir under the Statute of Descent and
Distribution. He has an uncle, his closest collateral kin, who
is excluded by the widow under the statute.'2 ' At common
law the widow is not an heir of the husband; but an uncle
of the intestate is. The widow, who is believed to be the sole
heir, sells the land to D. If the widow had title, D, if he can
qualify as a bona fde purchaser for value without notice,
will be protected against the unrecorded declaration of trust.=
But if the common law heir takes, under the rule, the widow
had no title to give: it was in the uncle. The Recording Act
could not, it is submitted, protect against the unrecorded- declaration of trust, because the wife was a stranger to the
title. Nor could the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchaser help D, because that is built upon a legal title competing against a prior equity, and D had no legal title since
the widow had none.
119. Richardson v. Day, note 22 suprc; Dominick v. Rhodes, note 20
supra.
120. Sec. 9041, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
121. Sec. 8906, S. C. Code of Laws 1942, as amended by Acts 1945,

p. 313.
122. Sec. 8875, S. C. Code of Laws 1942 (the general Recording Act).
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There are instances, it is true, where one who receives
what is supposed to be a legal title from another who does
not really have it will be protected. On analysis, they will be
seen, however, to arise in these cases: by adverse possession;
or by operation of the Recording Acts (as where the grantee
does not record his deed and the empty-handed grantor later
conveys the same property to another) ; or by the operation
of Acts having a similar design ;= or the purchaser may be
shielded by judicial determinations, as where one buys from
an administrator whose letters are thereafter revoked,m or
from a devisee, legatee or executor under a will which is
thereafter set aside,' the purchaser finding safety in the first
instance in the Probate Court's grant of administration, and
in the second in Probate Court's admission of the will to
probate; or the purchaser may be saved by the estoppel of the
owner, as where, with personal property, there has been a
clothing of another with the indicia of ownership.'m
None of these curatives will work the salvation of the
purchaser, D, in our hypothetical case; but if, perchance,
any one of them, or some other beneficent doctrine, should
do so, the stark fact remains that the purchaser did not
initially get a title, for the reason, again, that the supposed
heir was not the real one.
Death of the Trustee Testate
PersonalProperty.The authorities previously mentioned
and the observations made concerning the administrator of
the intestate trustee cover the case of the testate trustee.
123. Such as Sec. 7047, commonly called the Bailment Statute, protecting subsequent purchasers of bailees or other persons in possession
of personal property-with some exceptions-from the undisclosed and
unrecorded reservation of title in the owner. See Sec. 8945, S. C. Code
of Laws 1942, protecting purchasers of a decedent's property where
the decedent's will is not filed for probate within a year of death. A
purchaser from a supposed heir will be protected against a devisee if
he purchases before the probate of the will if such probate is not had
within the year.
124. Benson v. Rice, 2 Nott & McCord's Law 577 (1820); Foster v.
Brown, 1 Bailey's Law 221, 19 Am. Dec. 672 (1829); Price v. Nesbitt,
1 Hill's Equity 445 (1834).
125. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 208 S. C. 157, 37 S. E. (2d) 507 (1946).
126. Russell Willis, Inc. v. Page, 213 $. C. 156, 48 S. E. (2d) 627
(1948).
127. See note 93 supra.
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,On death, the title to all his personal estate, whether held in
his own right or in trust, passes to his executor or other per.son qualifying to administer the estate. As in the case of the
.administrator, he cannot utilize the trust property as assets
,of his decedent's estate, either for the purpose of satisfying
Ihis testator's creditors or transferring it to legatees. Nor can
he properly function as successor trustee, at least with respect to those acts that do not involve passivity or contem-plate the mere formal transfer of the trust subject matter to
the beneficiaries. In this connection, it is useful to repeat the
language in Ex Porte Knitst,2 concerning the executrix of
.a deceased surviving co-trustee: "In strictness, the office was
not vacant in this instance, for the trust devolved on the
executrix."
2
In Dean v. LangforZ,m
where an executrix, wife of a deceased trustee, asked to be relieved of the trust, the court
-declared:
"As the executrix of her husband she is merely a constructive, and not a technical trustee under the provisions
of (the settlor's) will. She is only so far a trustee as that
the legal title to the personalty may rest in her. * * She
has the right to the aid of the court in being relieved
from this relation."
Other cases, which incidentally involve the same situation,
-make it clear that the title of the testate trustee devolves upon
-the executor in the way mentioned.= °
The same channel of transmission to the executor appears
where the deceased trustee held personal property under a
xesulting or constructive trust.-"
Real Property. When the trustee dies leaving a will, the
Teal property which he held in trust will pass to his devisees,
"-provided that the language of the will is sufficiently compre128. Note 79

8uprm; and the quoted text to note 87 supra.
129. Note 80 supra.
130. Phaelan v. Perman, 2 MeCord's Equity 423 (1827); McIntyre
xv. McClenaghan, note 94 supra; Bolling v. Stokes, 7 S. C. 364 (1875).
131. Wamburzee v. Kennedy, 4 DeSaussure's Equity 474 (1814);
"Towles v. Burton, Richardson's Equity Cases 146, 24 Am. Dec. 409
(1832); McDonald v. May, 1 Richardson's Equity 91 (1844); Sollee v.
oCroft, note 22 supra; Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S. C. 122, 117 S. E. 1192
.(1922)---see the concurring opinion.
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hensive to embrace it. If he specifically devises it, the property will thus pass; and the same will happen if his entire
estate is carried by a general disposition or if there is a
general residue into which it can fall. If none of these dispositive features is present, or if the tenor of the will is such
as to indicate an intention that the trust title shall not pass
thereunderp he will die intestate as to that property, with
the title devolving upon the common law heir. At least the
1
authorities as a whole assert that the devisee will take, 3'
and, basically, the same logic that puts the title to personal
property in the executor should put the title to real estate in
the devisee. But here, it must be admitted, the South Carolina
cases are not altogether clear and should be given scrutiny.
Under the principle that a trust cannot be delegated,1 3
it is reasonably apparent that a trustee cannot, of his own
motion, confer trust duties or power upon a nominee under
his will. Such an act would amount to the trustee's appointment of his successor, an appointment not sanctioned by the
settlor or by the court.M5 Of course, if the settlor has evinced
an intention to permit his trustee to name the successor, the
intention must be respected; but the cases have gone a long
way from the old English rule that a transfer to a trustee,
"his heirs, executors and assigns", gave, by virtue of the
quoted words, the power to the trustee to designate his successor by will.36 The rule has never found favor in the United
States, and it would require language of clear import to find
authority given to a trustee to select his successor by his will.
In Withers v. Yeadon, 7 a testator devised real and personal property to his son to apply the rents and income to the
use of his family, with power to select by deed or will among
the son's children. The trustee died, leaving a will, under
132. See Scott on Trusts, Sec. 105.
133. See note 93 supra.
134. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 171; Scott on Trusts, Sees. 171, 171.1;
Withers v. Yeadon, note 95 supra; Shannon v. Freeman, 117 S. C. 480v
109 S. E. 406 (1921) ; Black v. Erwin, Harper's Law 410 (1824) ; Glenn
v. Walker, 113 S. C. 1, 100 S. E. 706 .(1919). The problem of delegationr
is usually presented during the life of the trustee, but any attempt to,
pass on the administration of the trust to one unauthorized is obviously
an improper delegation.
135. Scott on Trusts, See. 105.

136. Scott on Trusts, Sec. 105.
137. Note 95 aupra.
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which he gave all his estate to his wife, with a direction to
his executors, his wife and son, to carry out the trusts under
his father's will. Construing the power as one in, or with a,
trust, the lower court (Chancellor Johnston) held the power
of selection to be non-delegable, and, the original trustee having failed to make the selection, the property went to the
son's children equally. In discussing the devolution of the
property on the trustee's death, the Chancellor entertained
doubt as to whether the title to the real estate passed to the
heirs or to the wife as devisee, but concluded that, in -ny
event, whoever took would be bound by the trusts.'2 On
appeal the court affirmed the decree, but stated that the legal
title passed to the trustee's wife, as general devisee, subject
to the trusts. The holding here is clear that a devisee, under
a general disposition, takes the title, and not the heir, or heirs.
In Dean v. Langford, from which quotation in part has
already been made, the lower court decree, affirmed on appeal, contains this language concerning the executrix of the
deceased trustee: "She is only so far a trustee as that the
legal title to the personalty may rest in her as that of the
realty (if any) devised to her husband in trust, would rest
in his heirs." Since it does not appear that there was real
estate in the trust, the statement as to that type of property
is not determinative, although, perhaps, it does indicate a
thinking opposed to the concept of the succession of the devisee to the title.
An element of considerable uncertainty is thrown into
what is a rule of intrinsic simplicity by the decision in
Sullivan v. Latimer.j4o This was an action for the recovery
of land brought by a substituted trustee, who succeeded to
the office by decree upon ex parte application. The property
in dispute was devised in trust for the testator's daughter.
The trustee regularly performed his duties until his death.
He left a will giving all his property, real and personal, to his
brothers. The executor brought action to sell the testator's
property to meet debts and included the trust property in
the proceeding. The trust property was sold as the absolute
property of the testator to a purchaser,* who according to
the testimony, knew of the trust. Thereafter the purchaser
138. The language is set out in the text to note 101 supra.

139. Note 80 supra; see the text to note 129 supra.
140. Note 76 supra.
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died testate leaving the property to the defendants. An objection that the substitute trustee in this action was improperly appointed was dismissed;141 but it was argued further
that the defendants should have been made parties to the
suit for appointment on the ground that they had derived title
from their source, who in turn had acquired title under the
sale of the interest of the devisees under the deceased trustee's
will. The court held that the presence of the holders of the
legal title was not necessary, and it then went on to say:
"M. A. Sullivan had the legal title as trustee. * *
When he died, where did the legal title go? We incline
to think that M. A. Sullivan, giving by his will all his
property, real and personal, to his brothers * * did not
intend to devise the trust tract as his own absolute property. It is not to be presumed that in the last most solemn
act of his life, he meant to perpetrate a deliberate fraud
upon his sister, by appropriating her land which he held
as trustee. If not, the legal title must have descended
to his heirs (sic). But if we must assume that he did so
intend, that he undertook to devise the land absolutely
to his brother, who must have had full knowledge of the
trust in the will of their father * * such attempted devise was manifestly a flagrant disregard of the rights of
the cestui que trust; and the subsequent proceedings to
sell the land as the absolute property of M. A. Sullivan,
without any notice whatever to the equitable owners,
was absolutely void, carrying no title to Hewlet Sullivan,
the purchaser, or those who claim through him."
No definitive principle emerges from this language, which
seemingly "makes the test of devolution dependent not upon
the words of the will, but upon the hidden intent of the
testator. The matter is further obscured by a later statembnt
of the court that the purchaser at the judicial sale "became
trustee by his purchase"--a result hardly possible unless the
sale carried the title. If the sale carried the title, even as
against the words of the court that it did not, then there must
be a finding that the devise was a fraud; and if there was
such a finding of fraud, it does not appear in the case, unless
there is a subversion of the principle that criminal conduct
or fraud will not be presumed. The virtue of the rule that
141. See text to notes 79 and 82 supra.
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the devisee will take by general devise is that it avoids the
necessity of speculating as to the purity or impurity of the
motives of the testate trustee. The reproach should be directed,
instead, towards the devisee who, if he knows of the trust,
ought not to keep the property. The court in this case, confronted with the plea of the Statute of Limitations, concluded
that the purchaser, being a trustee, and having taken the
land cur onere, could not avail himself of the Statute or claim
adversely to his cestui; and that even if he were called a constructive trustee, the result would be the same, since the adverse acts were not brought home to the beneficiary. To reach
this result, the original trustee (who cannot be presumed to
have done a fraudulent act) must have passed the title to
the devisee under the will: for, if it did not pass to the
devisee, and if the purchaser at the judicial sale got no title
whatsoever, the purchaser would be a stranger to the title,
there would be no trust, and there could have been an adverse
holding. All in all, this case cannot be regarded as weighty
authority opposed to the general proposition that a testate
trustee's title to real property passes to his devisee.
Where property is held on a resulting trust and the trustee dies testate, the devisee, if the language is comprehensive
enough, takes subject to the trust,'4 and no case has been
found suggesting that it goes to the common law or statutory
heirs. The same is to be observed of constructive trusts.'4
Death of a Co-Trustee
From the nature of things, the title of co-trustees isjoint,144 and it has never been suggested that such trustees
142. Brown v. Cave, 23 S. C. 251 (1885); Miller v. Cramer, 48 S. C.
282, 26 S. E. 657 (1896).

143. Stuckey v. Truett, note 131 supra.
144. Scott on Trusts, Sec. 103; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, See.

145; Tiffany on Real Property (3d Ed.), Sec. 283; 65 C. J. 636; 48
C. J. S. 919; 54 Am. Jur. 91; 130 Am. St. Rep. 508. It is to be noted
that there is a requirement of unanimity for trust action: that is, all
the living trustees must act in concert, and this without regard to
whether the trust property is real or personal, unless the trust instru-

ment confers the power to act upon less than the whole number. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 194; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 194; DeSaussure v.
Lyons, 9 S. C. 492 (1877). An exception seems to exist in the case of
charitable trusts, and the general rule is that a majority of the trustees
may act. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 383; Scott on Trusts, Sees. 194,
383; Ex Parte Trustees of Greenville Academies, 7 Richardson's Equity
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take undivided interests in the trust property; although it
is conceivable that a settlor might declare an intention that
the holding should be of that character. Where the co-trustees
consist of corporations, or of a corporation and a natural
person, the majority of cases, and the better opinion, seem
to hold that they likewise hold as joint tenants ;145 but it has
been held in South Carolina, in the case of Telfair v. Howe,140
that a corporation cannot be a joint tenant, either with
another corporation or with a natural person. The significance
of this holding will appear hereafter.
The principal attribute of the joint estate is, of course,
survivorship, and the question naturally arises whether, in
the first place, there is survivorship if the joint estate is held
by trustees as distinguished from persons holding in their
own right, and, in the second place, whether the statute abolishing joint tenancies, 14 or their incident of survivorship,
applies to the estate when held by co-trustees. As to the first
phase of the question, there seems to be no serious assertion
anywhere that the joint estate of trustees carries within itself the destruction of the feature of survivorship. As to the
second phase-the impact of the statute-the rule is almost
universally followed that statutes of this kind do not affect
trust estates, and that the incident of survivorship is unimpaired. 14a Hence, when one of several trustees dies, even without expression to that effect by the settlor, the title is in
the survivors, and so on, the title ultimately residing in the
last surviving trustee. 149 Upon the death of the sole surviving
471 (1854). See State ex rel Daniel v. Strong, 185 S. C. 27, 192 S. E.
671 (1937). The requirement of unanimity is not present with executors:
as to personal property, the authority, for all practical purposes, is
joint and several: Rosborough v. MeAliley, 10 S. C. 235 (1878); Chapman v. City Council, 30 S. C. 549, 9 S. E. 591, 3 L.R.A. 311 (1888);
Smith v. Heyward, 115 S. C. 145, 105 S. E. 275 (1920). As to the power
to sell real estate, a majority of the executors who qualify may act,
unless the testator's intention is 'that all must perform: Sec. 9054, S. C.
Code of Laws 1942; DeSaussure v. Lyons, this note supra.
145. Scott on Trusts, Sec. 103; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sees.
145, 530.
.146. Note 37 supra.
147. Sec. 8911, S. C. Code of Laws 1942. See notes 36, 37, and 38
•supra, and accompanying text.
148. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 103, and comm. a; Scott on Trusts,
Sec. 103; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Secs. 145, 530; 65 C. J. 636,
669; 54 Am. Jur. 92; 130 Am. St. Rep. 508.
149. See the authorities in note 148 supra.
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trustee, the devolution of title is as if he had been the only
trustee and is governed by principles previously discussed.
The rule, apparently, is based on the presumed intention of
the settlor: that having selected several persons, he would desire that, on the death of one or more, the remainder should
have, and be able to utilize, the title.
The point seems not to have been seriously discussed in
many South Carolina cases, and it may be assumed, from the
courses that the cases have taken, that the principle of survivorship is intact. In Ex ParteKnust,10 where there were two
trustees of personal property and both of them died, it was
held that the title ultimately passed to the executrix of the
surviving trustee, a result which could follow only if the title
went from the first to the second trustee upon the first's
death. In Andrews v. U. S. F. & G. Co.,m' the question arose
quite directly. There, two co-guardians who had held a real
estate mortgage as investment took title to the mortgaged
property from the mortgagor in satisfaction of the debt secured. Although guardians are not, as a rule, strict trustees,
in that they do not have title to the ward's property, 2 yet,
in this case, since the deed ran directly to the guardians, they
were treated as trustees meeting the requirement of title.
Upon the death of one of the trustees, the title was held to
pass to the survivor. The conclusion was bottomed upon the
rule, as enunciated by Perry,= that the title of trustees is
joint, the incident of survivorship is present, and that statutes
affecting joint tenancies do not change the rule. Therefore,
it was held that a deed- by the surviving trustee would pass
the entire estate, and not a mere one-half interest. A majority
of the court, however, while conceding that the entire interest
passed to the survivor, held that the sale made by the surviving trustee was beyond his powers and the defect bound
the purchaser.

150. Note 79 supra.
151. 154 S. C. 456, 153 S. E. 745 (1929).
152. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 7; Long v. Cason, 4 Richardson's
Equity 60 (1851); Moore v. Hood, 9 Richardson's Equity 311, 70 Am.
Dec. 210 (1857); McDuffie v. McIntyre, 11 S. C. 551, 32 Am. Rep. 500

(1878); Gary v. Bank, note 94 supra; Bagwell v. Hinton, note 94 supra.
153. Perry on Trusts (5th Ed.), Vol. I, pp.' 499, 500, restated in the

7th Ed., Sec. 343.
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It has already been indicated that, under Telfair v. Hower
a corporation cannot be a joint tenant, either with another
corporation or with a natural person. In that case a testamentary gift, not in trust, was made to what appeared to be
two corporations. One actually did not exist. It was held
that the other donee took only one-half, and not the whole
by way of accretion. The principal reason is thus stated:
"It is clear that, by the principles of the common law,
none but natural persons can take in joint tenancy. A
corporation cannot take this estate, either jointly with
another corporation, or with a natural person. The reason assigned in the early writers is, that they hold in
different capacities and in different rights."
The case quite correctly states the common law rule.
Another reason advanced for the common law rule which is
perhaps an amplification of the ground quoted, is that inherently there must be survivorship if a true joint tenancy
is to exist; that, corporations having perpetual life, if there
were corporation co-trustees, one could never survive the
other; and if there were co-trustees consisting of a corporation and a natural person, death could occur only to the
latter. This would be repugnant to the concepts of death and
survivorship applicable to both joint tenants. The conclusion
that is to be drawn from the case is that where a corporation
is co-trustee with another corporation, or with a natural person, the taking is in halves; hence, in dealing with death as
a fact, upon the death of the individual who is co-trustee with
a corporation, the corporation does not succeed to the whole
title. The title remains fractional, the original share residing
in the corporate trustee, and the share of the natural person
passing to his successors in title. Unless the corporate concepts then held are to be modified by the court in a proper
case, the South Carolina law is that, unless the trust instrument expressly or by fair implication puts the whole title in
the corporate trustee upon the personal trustee's death, the
cleavage in interest remains, with all the complications that
that division suggests. Perhaps today, with a watering down
of the notion that corporations have eternal life and the
substitution of the fact that they too are mortal-through
154. Note 37 supra, and text to note 146 supra.
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dissolution, charter forfeitures, consolidations, and the like5
-the court may in time scrap the common law principle; but
it has not done so yet. The prudent course at this time is to
provide in the trust instrument for survivorship of both title
and powers in such a case-a course, frankly, that is advisable even when all the trustees are natural persons.
Accompanying the passage of title to the surviving trustee
(leaving aside the corporate trustee) is the transmission of
powers, unless the intent is manifest that the whole number
shall act.5 Of course, if the power asserted by, or alleged to
be in, the surviving trustee was one which the original
trustees themselves never possessed, it hardly needs saying
that the surviving trustee acquires no such power, 5 7 unless, improbably, the settlor conferred such a distinctive
power upon the survivor. There are numerous cases in this,
state involving the continuance of powers in surviving executors. These cases draw upon trust principles and analogies.
to reach the conclusion that where powers are attached to the
office and are not purely personal, they do not cease but will'
pass to the survivors.158 Since these decisions formulate principles founded upon concepts in the law of trusts, they are,
necessarily, formidable authority for the proposition that in
trusts non-personal powers pass to surviving trustees.
Authority need not be cited to make the point that, a
fortiori,the principle of survivorship-of title and powersoperates as effectively in the field of charitable trusts as it
does in the realm of private trusts.
Dower
It has already been seen that the wife of a deceased beneficiary of trust property is not entitled to dower, since the
155. See Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Conner, 195 S. C. 203,
11 S. E. (2d) 271, 131 A.L.R. 748 (1940), involving the trusteeship
of an individual and a state bank, which was later converted into a
national bank.
156. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 195; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 195;
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 530; 54 Am. Jur. 92, 235; 130
Am. St. Rep 508; Andrews v. U. S. F. & G. Co., note 151 supra.
157. See Andrews v. U. S. F. & G. Co., note 151 supra.
158. Mallet v. Smith, 6 Richardson's Equity 12, 60 Am. Dec. 107
(1853); Smith v. Winn, 27 S. C. 591, 4 S. E. 240 (1887); Bredenburg
v. Bardin, 36 S. C. 197, 15 S. E. 372 (1891); Dick v. Harby, 48 S. C.
516, 26 S. E. 900 (1896). See also, Sec. 9054, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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seisin of the husband must be legal, and an equitable estate
will not do. But in order for dower to attach, the seisin-in
addition to being legal-must be beneficial, for the husband's
own use. A bare legal title is not enough. Hence, the universal rule is that the widow of a deceased trustee is not
dowable of the trust estate.60 And it is obvious that the widow
-cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice.'6 ' Whether the trust is created before marriage or
after, the broad' principle controls that the wife's right can
attach to no higher or different quality of estate than her
husband's. 62 Naturally, if a husband owned lands absolutely
and free of trust, a subsequent declaration of trust by him
would be-ineffectual against the wife's right of dower, which
had already attached, and only a renunciation or other effectual surrender of dower by the wife would free the trust
thus created from that right.
The South Carolina cases without exception agree to the
propositioji that the wife of a deceased trustee is not dowable. 63 They lay down the rule, too, that the principle covers
the case of the resulting trust, and in the typical situation of
the purchase-money resulting trust it is held that dower does
not attach to the estate of the deceased husband who held the
legal title for the benefit of the one whose funds were used
in the purcbase.'" There is no reason to assume that the re159. Douglass v. Dickson, 11 Richardson's Law 417 (1858); 28 C.
J. S. 76; 17 Am. Jur. 670; Tiffany on Real Property (3d Ed), Sec. 499.
160. Scott on Trusts, Sec. 289.1; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sec.
146; Tiffany on Real Property (3d Ed.), Sec. 499; 28 C. J. S. 76, 93;
17 Am. Jur.. 670.
161. Scott on Trusts, Sec. 289.1; 28 C. J. S. 93.
162. Davidson v. Graves, Bailey's Equity 268 (1831); Brown v. Cave,
note 142 supra. The principle, of course, is not limited to trusts: it extends to other equities and liens existing before marriage and to those
which exist, after marriage, at the time the husband acquires the property. The typical cases are those involving mortgages given before coverture and the purchase-money mortgage given during coverture.
163. Plantt v. Payne, 2 Bailey's Law 319 (1831) ; Davidson v. Graves,
note 162 8upra; Thompson v. Perry, 2 Hill's Equity 204, 29 Am. Dec.
68 (1835); Whitmire v. Wright, 22 S. C. 446, 53 Am. Rep. 725 (1884);
Brown v. Cave, note 142 supra; Pruitt v. Pruitt, 57 S. C. 155, 35 S. E.
485 (1891).
164. 28 C. J. S. 96; Thompson v. Perry, note 163 supra; McNish v.
Pope, 7 Richardson's Equity 186 (1855) ; Brown v. Cave, note 142 supra;
Pruitt v. Pruitt, note 163 supra.
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sult would be different if the land was impressed with a constructive trust.
Although the doctrine is clear, its applicability in a given
case may be difficult to establish. In the usual situation, a
settlor by deed or will transfers real property on trusts expressed in the trust instrument. No problem is here presented.
But where the trust is not expressed, two questions arise:
first, the effect of the Statute of Frauds relating to the
establishment of trusts in real property, 6 5 and, second, its
operation in relation to dower. If, absent elements conducive
to a constructive trust, the trust is oral and the transferee
sets up the statute, he keeps the property; and, concomitantly,
his wife, on his death, can claim dower. If the husband, having acquired property on an oral trust, thereafter acknowledges the trust by a memorandum satisfying the statute,
there can be no doubt that, so far as he is concerned, the
trust can be enforced against him and his successors in title
upon his death. But will the husband's memorandum, or his
carrying out of the trust, bind the wife? If it does not (and
we must assume that the trust is a genuine pre-existing one
and not pretensive), there will be the paradoxical result that
the wife's interest was not co-extensive with, but broader
than, her husband's. The rule generally followed is that if
the husband acquires lands in trust and he thereafter makes
a signed memorandum acknowledging or declaring the trust,
or if he carries out the trust, his acts are sufficient to bind
him and his wife.16
The rule just mentioned, however, seems not to prevail in
South Carolina. Three cases, at least, indicate departure from
it. In Davidson v. Graves,167 the court allowed a wife dower
as against a contention that the conveyance to the husband
had been made on undisclosed trusts. The nature of these
trusts was never made clear to the court, which stated: "It
would be very mischievous to allow such parol understandings
to set aside the whole conveyance, and to defeat the just claim
of. the dower, under the absolute conveyance and a vested fee
simple in her husband." No reference is made to the Statute
of Frauds, nor does the case disclose any memorandum made
165. Sec. 9041, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
166. Restatement of Trusts, See. 42 (b), and comm. g, ill. 4; Secs.
42, 43; Scott on Trusts, See. 42.3.
167. Note 162 supra.
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by the husband, although he seems to have carried out the
trusts in part by transfer. Under any view, the result here
is clearly right if the -trust could not be established at the
outset.
In Pruitt v. Pruitt,16s a widow's claim for dower was met
by a defense that the deceased husband had acquired the land
in trust for the defendant, who allegedly had furnished the
purchase money. The conveyance had been made after marriage. The husband thereafter transferred the land to the defendant, his mother, by a deed on which the defendant did
not renounce dower. An affidavit signed by the husband some
years after his acquisition of title, which admitted his trust,
and evidence of oral declarations made by him, were offered
to support the trust. Both were held properly rejected:
"While in this State one who holds possession under
a deed from the husband of the demandant in dower is
not estopped to show that the seizin of the husband was
as trustee and, therefore, his estate is not dowable * *
yet it is settled that such trust cannot be shown by the
declarations of the husband, made after legal seizin, so
as to effect the wife's dower. Tibbets v. Langley, 12 S. C.,
465. The case last cited held that recitals in a mortgage
deed by the husband after seizin are not admissible to
affect the wife's dower in the mortgaged lands, she not
being a party to such- mortgage. This rests upon the
ground that the favored right of dower, which attaches
to the seizin of the husband during coverture, should
not be impeached or defeated by subsequent acts or declarations of the husband; for the wife, as to dower, is
not inprivity ivith her husband after seizin, and to permit such declarations to defeat the wife's dower would
open wide the opportunity to destroy the right. Such acts
or declarations of the husband constitute no part of the
res gestae or transaction under which the legal seizin was
acquired."
Further evidence which was offered in the case to show
payment of the purchase price by the alleged cestui was held
not to be clear and convincing enough to raise the presumption of a resulting trust. The inference is plain that if there
had been satisfactory evidence, sufficient to establish such a
168. Note 163 supra.
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trust, the wife's claim of dower would fail. In the establishment of a purchase-money resulting trust, given the facts
showing payment, even the oral declarations of the alleged
trustee would be admissible under the saving statutory provisions 69 which exclude implied trusts from the operation of
the Statute of Frauds.
The authority of the last case is the basis for a similar
decision in Dowling v. DeWitt.17 The demandant's husband
had acquired title under the will of his first wife. After his
second marriage he conveyed the land to the predecessors of
the defendants by a deed which presumably did not carry
a renunciation of dower. At the time of this transfer the husband executed a declaration of trust admitting that the land
had been acquired by his first wife on an oral trust. The
writing, together with oral declarations, was rejected, the
former as not binding on the wife, the latter as an invalid attempt to prove an express trust by parol.
These cases are discordant in that, as has been indicated,
the wife's right of dower thus attaches to something her
husband never had; and because they are out of line with
the decisions which permit the holder of land subject to an
oral trust to make the requisite memorandum to establish,
as against his creditors, that he is not the real owner of the
land.m If the memorandum actually reveals the truth-that
the signer is not the real owner of the land-it should be as
effective in the one case as in the other.

169. Sec. 9042, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
170. 96 S. C. 435, 81 S. E. 173 (1913).
171. Price v. Brown, 4 S. C. 144 (1872) ; Ex Parte Trenholn, 19 S. C.

126 (1882) ; Finley v. Moore, 55 S. C. 195, 33 S. E. 362 (1898) ; U. S.
F. & G. Co. v. Mills, 146 Fed. (2d) 694 (C.C.A. 4, E. D. S. C.-1944).
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